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The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements
Howard M Erichson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When defendants settle litigation involving multiple plaintiffs, they
often insist that they will settle only if they obtain releases from all or
nearly all of the plaintiffs in the group. If a defendant is going to spend
money to resolve claims, it prefers to take its hit and move on. As one
experienced settlement administrator puts it, when a defendant
approaches plaintiffs' lawyers to discuss the settlement of a mass
dispute, the "subject might be broached in various terms, [but] the
underlying message is the same-'How much will it cost us to get out of
all of these cases?"" A settlement that leaves significant exposure-or
worse, that invites new claimants to join the fray by displaying easy
money-holds little appeal.
Judges, lawyers, and academics largely accept the drive for
comprehensive settlements as a given, and many embrace such
settlements as a positive goal.2 The Federal Judicial Center's Manualfor
Complex Litigation offers tips for judges on how to achieve global
settlements. Multidistrict proceedings, the Manual explains, "afford a
unique opportunity for the negotiation of a global settlement," and
transferee judges should "make the most of this opportunity. '4 The
Professor, Fordham Law School. My thanks to Laurence Abraham, Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, John Leubsdorf, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Russell Pearce, William Simon, and Benjamin
Zipursky for their comments and assistance. By way of disclosure, I testified as an expert witness on
behalf of the United States in the criminal trial arising out of the Kentucky fen-phen settlement, and I
have advised lawyers in connection with settlements in the Baycol, ephedra, fen-phen, Ketek, OrthoEvra, Rezulin, Vioxx, and Zyprexa litigations.
1. MATTHEW L. GARRETSON, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO AVOIDING AGGREGATE
SETTLEMENT CONFLICTS, 2 (2004), http://www.settlementplan.com/pdf/aggregate settlements.pdf;
see also PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES § 14:17 (2009) ("Nothing is more

natural than for the defendant in [a mass tort litigation] to want to offer an attorney who represents a
number of plaintiffs a lump sum which will settle all the cases.").
2. See generally Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (addressing the demand for closure in mass tort settlements
and criticizing the means by which closure has been sought).
3. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.132 (2004).
4. Id.
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American Law Institute's 2010 Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation proposes significant legal reforms to facilitate both settlement
class actions and all-or-nothing aggregate settlements. 5 Academics
describe global settlement as a 6value-generating enterprise and the
natural endgame of mass litigation.
All-or-nothing settlements, however, cause a lot of mischief.
Instances of unethical and even criminal conduct by plaintiffs' lawyers
may be traced to defendants' insistence on fully comprehensive deals.
Although the demand for comprehensive settlements is driven primarily
by defendants and their insurers, plaintiffs' lawyers bear the brunt of the
problem because all-or-nothing settlements put plaintiffs' lawyers in an
ethically shaky position. Over the past decade, a number of plaintiffs'
attorneys have faced disciplinary proceedings, civil lawsuits, and
criminal prosecutions for their conduct in connection with
comprehensive settlements in mass litigation. Although it is tempting to
put the blame on lawyers who engage in questionable conduct, it would
be a mistake to attribute the problem entirely to individual venality or
ignorance. The ethical problems with mass settlements are systemic and
linked to defendants' demands for fully inclusive deals.
This symposium, looking at aggregate litigation since Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor 7 and Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp., offers a
perfect opportunity to review the trouble caused by all-or-nothing
settlements. Amchem and Ortiz represented a high-water mark in the
search for comprehensive resolutions. Both of those asbestos settlement
class actions were driven by defendants' insistence on inclusiveness and

5. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 3.06, 3.14, 3.17(b) (2010)
[hereinafter AGGREGATE LITIGATION] (proposing that settlement class actions be certifiable even if
they could not be certified for litigation, opposing collateral attacks on class settlements, and
proposing that clients be permitted to give advance consent to aggregate settlements with a
supermajority voting provision).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT, at ix (2007)
("As in traditional tort litigation, the endgame for a mass tort dispute is not trial but settlement. But
the scope of the settlement differs. Here, the most ambitious settlements seek to make and enforce a
grand, all-encompassing peace in the subject area of the litigation as a whole."); Samuel Issacharoff,
Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SuP. CT. REv. 183, 217 (2009) (describing the challenge of
the Vioxx settlement as "how to create an effective bill of peace that would bring a reasonable (and
reasonably certain) end to the litigation"); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving
Complex Litigation If a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REv. 2205, 2223 (2008) ("The
MDL model, applied creatively, can be an effective alternative in certain situations to class treatment
for accomplishing an aggregate or global settlement. ... [T]he model may include bellwether trials
and a global settlement crafted cooperatively by counsel in both federal and state courts, and blessed
and overseen in execution by the MDL court.").
7. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
8. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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both were ultimately rejected for overreaching. 9 The Amchem settlement
arose out of the defendant asbestos consortium's refusal to settle
individual claims unless the deal provided a global resolution.' ° The
Ortiz settlement went even further, seeking total resolution without any
possibility of opt-outs." No procedural device outside of bankruptcy
offers greater finality than the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class action
approach attempted in Ortiz." The no-opt-out course in Ortiz was driven
by the defendant's primary liability insurer, which refused to participate
in any settlement unless the settlement could guarantee "total peace. ' ' 3
The Supreme Court rejected the aggressive use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in
Ortiz,'4 just as it had rejected the Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class action in
Amchem.' 5 The hunger for comprehensive settlements, however, has not
abated in the past decade. Rather, the field has shifted in part from Rule
23 settlement class actions to nonclass aggregate settlements.
In nonclass cases, defendants may pursue wholesale peace either
globally or firm-by-firm. In some mass settlements, defendants seek to
resolve an entire dispute and insist that the settlement include all or
Working with leading plaintiffs'
nearly all significant claimants.
lawyers, defendants may negotiate a global settlement with provisions to
ensure comprehensiveness. In other cases, defendants negotiate firm-byfirm settlements with plaintiffs' law firms that represent large numbers of
claimants, insisting that each settlement include all of the firm's clients
with claims against the defendant.
This Article employs a broad definition of "all-or-nothing
settlements." It includes not only settlements with explicit clauses that
condition the entire deal on full participation, but also settlements with
other provisions that reveal an expectation of full participation or create
pressure to bind every member of the claimant group. For example, it
at 864-65; Arnchem, 521 U.S. at 622-29.
9. See id.
10. The consortium of asbestos manufacturers, the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR),
approached a group of leading asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers to negotiate a settlement but refused to
settle individual asbestos claims unless the defendants could obtain a global resolution including
future claims. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600-01 ("CCR counsel approached the lawyers who had headed
the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee... [and who] represented thousands of plaintiffs with thenpending asbestos-related claims... CCR indicated in these discussions that it would resist
settlement of [those] cases absent 'some kind of protection for the future."').
11. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 825-26.
12. Id.at 843, 859-60.
13. See id. at 824 ("Because Continental conditioned its part in any settlement on a guarantee of
'total peace,' ensuring no unknown future liabilities, talks focused on the feasibility of a mandatory
class action, one binding all potential plaintiffs and giving none of them any choice to opt out of the
certified class.").
14. Id.
at 864-65.
15. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-25.
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includes settlements that are not fully funded by the defendant until after
the defendant receives releases from all of the claimants. It also includes
settlements in which the plaintiffs' lawyers agree to be retained by the
defendant upon the completion of the settlement, and those in which the
plaintiffs' lawyers agree to withdraw from representing any clients who
decline the settlement. The point of this Article is not to arrive at a
precise definition of an all-or-nothing settlement, but rather to understand
the ethical pressures created by various settlement structures that attempt
to ensure full participation by a group of claimants.
This Article examines the ethical downside of all-or-nothing
settlements. Part II tells the stories of lawyers who have faced trouble in
recent years over their handling of such settlements. The stories reveal
the opportunities and pressures created by defendants' insistence on
bringing all claimants into a settlement. Part III catalogues the ethical
problems created by demands for fully inclusive settlements. At least
seven types of problems arise: (1) conflict of interest problems, (2)
allocation problems, (3) the holdout problem, (4) the slush fund problem,
(5) the loyalty problem, (6) the informed consent problem, and (7) the
collusion problem.
Pointing out the trouble with all-or-nothing settlements does not
mean that such settlements should never be allowed. Nor does it mean
that comprehensiveness is an unworthy goal in mass dispute resolution.
Defendants have good reason to seek peace, and inclusive settlements
provide value for claimants as well as for defendants. 16 Rather, this
Article's catalogue of troubles suggests that the current love affair with
global
settlements-evident
in
academic
writings,
judicial
pronouncements, and defendant demands-should be tempered by a
realistic appreciation of the ethical downside.
II. LAWYERS IN TROUBLE

Aggregate settlements have led too many lawyers into trouble. The
trouble ranges from public criticism, civil lawsuits, and disciplinary
proceedings through felony prosecutions. t7 Some have faced substantial
16. See NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at ix; Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 218-19.
17. Not all courts have come down hard on lawyers who failed to comply with ethics
requirements in aggregate settlements. Particularly in cases involving advance consent, courts have
steered clear of criticizing the lawyers, even as those courts have rejected settlements for
noncompliance. In Hayes v. Eagle-PicherIndustries, Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894-95 (10th Cir. 1975),
the court undid an all-or-nothing, lump-sum settlement because not all of the clients consented.
Although the clients had agreed to be bound by a majority vote, the court held the arrangement
illegal under the aggregate settlement rule. Id. at 894. However, the court explicitly disavowed any
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punishment, but even lawyers who ultimately avoided sanctions or
liability faced the burden and stigma that comes with defending
themselves against charges of unethical conduct. To the extent these
lawyers engaged in wrongful conduct, undoubtedly some of the blame
can be laid on individual lawyers' greed or ignorance of ethical
obligations. Any large pot of money can create temptation, just as any
aggregate settlement can trip up unwary lawyers. An examination of
these stories, however, suggests that the problem is not simply aggregate
settlements, but settlements that push too hard to bring all claimants into
the deal. The problems with such settlements reach well beyond the
ordinary temptations of handling other people's money. While lawyers
who act unethically are fully responsible for what they have done, it is
worth stepping back to ask whether particular settlement structures are
particularly likely to generate serious ethical problems. All-or-nothing
settlements systematically and predictably create opportunities for abuse.
A.

The Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement

In 2009, attorneys William Gallion and Shirley Cunningham, Jr.
were convicted of multiple counts of federal wire fraud and sentenced to
twenty-five years and twenty years, respectively, for their handling of an
aggregate settlement in the fen-phen diet drugs litigation.' 8 They were
ordered, in addition, to pay over $127 million in restitution,1 9 and both
were permanently disbarred. 20
A colleague, Melbourne Mills, Jr.,

criticism of the plaintiffs' lawyer: "We are not to be understood as criticizing the professional
conduct of the trial attorney for the appellants .... Undoubtedly plaintiffs'-appellants' attorney at
the trial acted in good faith in handling a complex matter in which he was having to represent the
interests of a number of clients." Id. at 895 n.3. In Knisley v. City of Jacksonville, 497 N.E.2d 883,
886-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), the court reversed the enforcement of a settlement that had been
approved by a majority of the client group, finding the majority-rule approach "completely at odds
with our supreme court's Code of Professional Responsibility," but the court stopped short of
criticizing the lawyer for his conduct. In Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512,
522-24 (N.J. 2006), the court ultimately found a way to enforce the all-or-nothing settlement,
despite the court's conclusion that the majority-rule settlement violated the rules of professional
conduct. The court decided that its ruling would apply only prospectively, permitting enforcement
of the settlement, in part because the court considered the lawyer blameless: "Plaintiffs' counsel
represented plaintiffs that were from many different states and successfully sought to have all
plaintiffs agree in advance to be bound by a weighted majority. That effort was a plausible, although
incorrect, interpretation of [the rules of professional conduct]." Id. at 523.
18. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, E. Dist. Ky., Fen-Phen Lawyers Sentenced for Wire
Fraud & Wire Fraud Conspiracy (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao
/kye/press/august/fenphen-sent.html.
19. Id.
20. Gallion v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 266 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Ky. 2008); Cunningham v. Ky. Bar Ass'n,
266 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Ky. 2008).
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avoided criminal conviction but faced disciplinary sanctions.2' In a
parallel civil proceeding, all three were found liable to their former
clients for $42 million.
The story of what these lawyers did wrong
reveals some of the pressures and risks created when defendants demand
that all claimants be included in a mass settlement.
Gallion, Cunningham and Mills had represented the plaintiff class in
a Kentucky statewide fen-phen class action.2 3
After a separate
nationwide settlement class action resolved many of the claims, what
remained in the Kentucky class were approximately five hundred
plaintiffs who had opted out of the nationwide settlement. 24 The vast
majority of these plaintiffs were clients of Gallion, Cunningham and
Mills. 25 The defendant, American Home Products (AHP, now Wyeth),

approached the attorneys to negotiate a settlement for the claimants who
had signed individual retainer agreements with these three attorneys.
AHP agreed to pay $200 million to settle the claims of the attorneys' fenphen clients.26 The settlement of the 440 individual claims was
conditioned on decertification of the Kentucky class action.27

21. Mills was indicted along with Gallion and Cunningham but was acquitted on the grounds
that he had been too drunk to form the requisite criminal intent. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Jury
Acquits Fen-PhenLawyer Wo Used Drinking Defense in FraudCase, ABA JOURNAL ONLINE, July
1, 2008,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/juryacquitsfen_phenlawyer-mills of defrauding
-clients. Gallion and Cunningham were convicted in a subsequent retrial without Mills. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text. Mills was suspended from practice in 2006. Inquiry Comm'n v.
Mills, 203 S.W.3d 130, 130 (Ky. 2006). In 2009, a hearing officer recommended that Mills be
permanently disbarred. See Andrew Wolfson, Permanent Disbarment Recommendedfor Fen-Phen
Lawyer Mills, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 28, 2009, at Al.
22. Andrew Wolfson, Attorney Toppled Diet-Drug Case Goliaths, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 8, 2009, at Al.
23. Cunningham, 266 S.W. 3d at 808-09.
24. Press Release, supra note 18.
25. Id.
26. Letter Agreement from American Home Products to William Gallion et al., Settling
Attorneys (May 1, 2001), available at http://news.cincinnati.com/includes/sections/fen/fenl.pdf
[hereinafter Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement] ("In settlement of the Diet Drug Claims of
the Settling Claimants and in consideration for (i) the releases and dismissals provided by the
Settling Claimants and (ii) the further obligations of the Settling Attorneys and Settling Claimants,
all as provided herein, AHP shall pay you $200,000,000 ('the Settlement Amount'), subject to the
adjustments and terms set forth in paragraphs 7-14.").
27. Id. para. 13(B) ("The Settling Attorneys will move to decertify the class action claims
against AHP in the Lawsuit. This settlement is contingent upon the entry of an order decertifying
those class action claims ...");id para. 13(C) ("The Settling Attorneys will dismiss with prejudice
the Lawsuit in its entirety, including all defendants and all claims. This settlement is contingent
upon the entry of... an order dismissing the Lawsuit in its entirety ....); see also United States v.
Gallion, 257 F.R.D. 141, 144 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (concluding as a matter of law that "the... settlement
was an aggregate settlement involving 440 claimants represented by the Defendants [Gallion and
Cunningham] and Melbourne Mills").
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The agreement between AHP and the plaintiffs' attorneys announced
its goal of resolving all of the fen-phen claims of the clients represented
by these attorneys: "This letter sets forth the final and complete terms on
which American Home Products... will settle all Diet Drug Claims with
the Settling Attorneys and the Settling Claimants."28 The lawyers
affirmed that the "Settling Claimants" listed in the agreement included
"all clients represented by the Settling Attorneys" who have diet drug
claims and who opted out of the nationwide settlement class action or
were not included in that class action.2 9
As often occurs in all-or-nothing settlements, the defendant
disavowed any responsibility for allocation of the settlement amount:
The allocation of the Settlement Amount among the Settling Attorneys
and Settling Claimants is the sole responsibility of the Settling
Attorneys and the Settling Claimants. AHP has not stated or otherwise
indicated any position or opinion on the allocation of the Settlement
Amounts to any Settling
Claimant and has not participated in any way
30
in such allocation.
The agreement instructed the plaintiffs' lawyers to allocate the money to
the individual claimants.3 '
The agreement contained a walkaway clause that permitted AHP to
terminate the agreement if fewer than 95% of the claimants provided
releases.32 The phrasing of the provision, however, made it clear that the
plaintiffs' lawyers were expected to provide releases from "each and
every" fen-phen client:
Each and every Settling Claimant will sign a release in the form
attached as Exhibit 1. The Settling Attorneys will be responsible for
providing AHP with the signed releases for the Settling Claimants by
September 1, 2001, unless AHP agrees to extend the deadline. If the
Settling Attorneys do not provide signed releases for 95% of the
Settling Claimants by the applicable deadline, and AHP does not
extend the deadline, AHP shall have the right thereafter to declare this
33
Letter Agreement terminated ....

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement, supra note 26, at intro, para.
Id.
para. 3(A).
Id. para. 5(A).
Id. para. 6.
Id. para. 10.
Id.
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In addition to the duty to obtain releases from every client, the agreement
imposed a duty on the plaintiffs' lawyers to obtain a dismissal with
prejudice of each of their clients' lawsuits.34
The plaintiffs' lawyers prepared an allocation of the settlement
funds, just as the agreement required. At that point, had they handled the
settlement correctly, the lawyers could have gone forward with the
settlement and avoided the criminal, civil, and disciplinary charges.
First, they should have disclosed the full terms of the aggregate
settlement to each of their clients and requested each client's informed
consent as required by Kentucky's legal ethics rules. 35 If the required
releases and dismissals were obtained, and AHP funded the settlement,
the lawyers should have given each client the full allocated amount
minus costs and fees pursuant to their fee agreements. Had they done so,
the lawyers would have earned over $60 million in legitimate fees; 3 6 their
agreements with their clients entitled the lawyers to contingent fees of
between 30 and 33 1/3%.
Instead, the lawyers engaged in a course of conduct that landed them
in prison. The lawyers did not inform each client of the full allocated
amount. Rather, they offered their clients lower amounts, then used
subsequent distributions as opportunities to seek additional fees beyond
the amount specified in their fee agreements. 37
The Kentucky Supreme Court's disbarment order describes the
lawyers' handling of the settlement. It is worth quoting at length as it
provides important details that connect the lawyers' misconduct to the
all-or-nothing lump-sum nature of the settlement with AHP:
A settlement agreement was reached in May 2001 resulting in one lump
sum payment to be divided among all plaintiffs. The agreement also
provided that a portion of the settlement would be paid to [William
Gallion] and two other attorneys, Melbourne Mills, Jr. and Shirley A.
Cunningham, Jr., who were affiliated with the case. The agreement
allowed [Gallion], Mills, and Cunningham to divide the settlement
amount between plaintiffs at their discretion and also determine how
much they personally were to be paid. The total amount of settlement
funds to be distributed was $200,450,000.

34. Id. para. 11 ("The Settling Attorneys will be responsible for providing AHP with an
executed dismissal with prejudice for Settling Claimants (and, if applicable, the spouse and children)
who have a pending civil action.").
35. See Ky. SCR 3.130(1.8)(g).
36. Andrew Wolfson, 2 sentenced in fen-phen fraud case, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.),
Aug. 18, 2009, at Al.
37. See Press Release, supra note 18.
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A staff member working with [Gallion], Mills, or Cunningham
contacted each of the plaintiffs and informed them how much
settlement money he would receive. The plaintiffs were never
informed that their lawyers actually determined the amount of money
they were to be given. If a plaintiff complained about the settlement
amount, he was coerced by the attorneys or their staff to take the
amount offered under the guise that it was what AHP had specifically
offered them. Each plaintiff signed a confidentiality agreement and
some plaintiffs were even told that they could go to jail if they
discussed the terms of their individual settlement. At no point were the
plaintiffs told about the total settlement arrangement from AHP. No
plaintiff received a notice of the settlement process, the manner in
which their settlement amounts were decided upon, or their right to opt
out of the settlement and proceed to trial....
In June 2002, nearly $70 million of the settlement funds had not
been distributed. The money was improperly deposited in the personal
accounts of the attorneys. An order was entered by [the judge] to give
fifty percent of the remaining funds to the plaintiffs, and fifty percent to
[Gallion], Mills, Cunningham and several other attorneys for
"indemnification or contingent liabilities." The record shows that there
were no "contingent liabilities."
In July 2002 another order was issued by the Boone Circuit Court.
This divided any remaining funds between the attorneys for
"outstanding litigation and administrative expenses" and a charitable
organization which was to be created. No statement exists showing
what outstanding litigation or administrative expenses existed at that
time. The July 2002 order implied that all plaintiffs had consented to
the creation of the charity. However, the record clearly shows that the
plaintiffs did not knowingly consent to the creation of a non-profit
charity like the one being proposed.
In January 2003, The Kentucky Fund for Healthy Living, Inc. was
[established].
[Gallion], Mills, and Cunningham transferred $20
million of the remaining settlement from their own personal accounts in
order to fund the entity. [Gallion] was paid a salary for serving as one
of the charity's board members.
In total, the attorneys
received approximately $104,337,000 from
38
the total settlement.

38. Gallion v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 266 S.W.3d 802, 803-04 (Ky. 2008); see also Cunningham v.
Ky. Bar Ass'n, 266 S.W.3d 808 (Ky. 2008) (reciting identical facts with regard to Shirley
Cunningham, Jr.); see also United States v. Gallion, 257 F.R.D. 141, 147 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (noting
the federal court agreement with the Kentucky Supreme Court's "numerous legal conclusions
regarding the Defendants' ethical violations").
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The misconduct of the Kentucky fen-phen lawyers would not have
occurred but for the all-or-nothing lump-sum nature of the deal offered
by AHP. Obviously, this does not excuse the lawyers' conduct. The
sentencing judge, imposing long prison terms on Gallion and
Cunningham, emphasized the lawyers' "'unbridled greed,"' noting that
they would have earned millions of dollars in legitimate fees, but it
"'appear[ed] to the court that they just wanted more."' 39 The point of
this study, however, is to look beyond the propensities of individual
lawyers and to consider how the lump-sum aspect of the settlement
created pressures and opportunities for wrongdoing.
First, it is worth asking whether the Kentucky fen-phen settlement
was an all-or-nothing settlement. The 95% walkaway clause suggests
that it was not all-or-nothing but rather a most-or-nothing settlement of
the sort this paper suggests is less conducive to abuse.4 1 Other language
in the agreement, however, makes it clear that the deal was to resolve all
of the attorneys' clients' diet drug claims, and that in exchange for the
lump sum of $200 million, the lawyers were expected to deliver
dismissals and releases for all 440 of their diet drug clients.42 The
federal court, quoting the findings in the Kentucky Supreme Court
disbarment orders, noted that the "settlement resulted in 'one lump sum
payment to be divided among all plaintiffs."-A3 During the first criminal
trial, Gallion testified that he understood the deal to be a lump-sum
payment in settlement of all remaining Kentucky diet drug claims.44
Treating the settlement as a lump sum gave the plaintiffs' lawyers
control over the money, setting up the opportunity for misappropriation.
AHP disavowed any role in allocating the money among the claimants.45
In the Kentucky settlement, like other settlements that contemplate
participation by all of the claimants in the group, the defendant preferred
to pay a lump sum and leave the allocation to plaintiffs' counsel.
With control over the money and pressure to get releases from all of
their clients, the plaintiffs' lawyers reserved some of the money from the
initial settlement amounts they relayed to clients.46 To the extent the
39. Wolfson, supra note 36.
40. Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement, supra note 26, at para. 10.
41. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 28-29, 33-34 and accompanying text.
43. United States v. Gallion, 257 F.R.D. 141, 146 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (quoting Kentucky Supreme
Court disbarment orders of William Gallion and Shirley Cunningham, Jr. (Oct. 23, 2008)).
44. See Andrew Wolfson, Diet-drug lawyer clashes withjudge, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), June 14, 2008, at Al.
45. Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement, supra note 26, at para. 3.
46. Gallion v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 266 S.W.3d 802, 802-03 (Ky. 2008).
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lawyers did this in order to adjust offers as necessary to secure every
client's assent, this is an example of what this Article labels the "slush
fund problem. ' '47 Rather than seeking each client's informed consent
based on full disclosure of the aggregate settlement terms,48 the lawyers
pressured clients to accept the offers and failed to inform clients of the
total deal or of the clients' right to decline the settlement.4 9
The lawyers' reservation of funds proved to be the starting point for
multiple ethical breaches. In the face of the "allocation problem"
common to lump-sum settlements,50 the lawyers took the wrong step of
misleading their clients into believing that their individual offer amounts
came directly from the defendant, rather than from their own lawyers.5 1
With funds remaining after the initial distribution, the lawyers took
another wrong step by asking the court for additional fees out of a second
distribution after the lawyers had already paid themselves the full amount
to which their retainer agreements entitled them.5 2 They took a third
wrong step by using remaining funds to create a not-for-profit entity,
hiring themselves as paid managers. 53 In the end, the plaintiffs' lawyers
faced disciplinary sanctions, civil liability and criminal punishment for
the misconduct that flowed from the pressures and opportunities created
by an all-or-nothing lump-sum deal.
B. The Napoli Fen-Phen Settlement
In New York, another fen-phen aggregate settlement resulted in
accusations that a law firm manipulated the settlement to its own
advantage. Like the Kentucky settlement, the New York settlement
involved a lump-sum payment by AHP to resolve a law firm's entire
inventory of diet drug claims.

47. See infra Part I1.D (discussing the slush fund problem).
(discussing the informed consent problem).
48. See infra Part III.F
49. See Gallion,266 S.W.3d at 803.
50. See infra Part III.B (discussing the allocation problem).
51. See Gallion,266 S.W.3d at 803.
52. See id. at 804.
53. Id.; Cunningham v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 266 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Ky. 2008). See also United
States v. Gallion, 257 F.R.D. 141, 150-51 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (barring defendants' proffered expert
testimony concerning the cy pres trust on grounds that such trusts are unwarranted in non-class
aggregate settlements).
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The law firm of Napoli, Kaiser & Bern ("Napoli") represented
approximately 5600 clients with fen-phen claims against AHP. 54 Many
of the clients had been referred by other law firms. When the fen-phen
nationwide settlement class action was reached, Napoli advised its clients
to opt out. 55 AHP and Napoli then undertook negotiations to settle the
firm's entire inventory of fen-phen claims. They reached a deal in56which
AHP "offered a large sum of money to settle virtually all claims.,
After the settlement was consummated, some clients and other
lawyers accused Napoli of misleading clients and manipulating the
settlement to maximize the firm's legal fees. A class action was filed in
federal court on behalf of the firm's clients.5 7 In New York state court,
another law firm claimed that Napoli cheated other firms out of referral
fees by allocating more settlement funds to its own clients than to clients
who had been referred by other firms.
A New York judge described the plaintiffs' central accusations
against Napoli:
The record on this motion... unfortunately raised serious questions
regarding the settlement process herein, including claims that:
(1) claimants who were Napoli Firm clients were offered
disproportionately larger settlements because the firm unfairly inflated
settlement offers for its clients so that the attorneys' fees earned by the
firm would be greater;
54. Buckwalter v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 01 Civ 10868LTSHBP, 2005 WL 736216,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005).
55. Id.
56. Appel-Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. (In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig.), No. 700000/98, 2007 WL
969426, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 2007) (footnote omitted), affd, 850 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App.
2008). The settlement amount was subject to a confidentiality agreement, see id at *1 n.3, but news
sources estimated the deal at $1 billion; see Anthony DePalma, 9/11 Lawyer Made Name in Lawsuit
on Diet Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at 23 ("The details of the settlement were sealed by the
courts, but The New York Law Journal and other publications estimated that it was worth $1 billion
and that it provided legal fees of roughly $350 million.").
57. Buckwalter, 2005 WL 736216, at *1.The court described the settlement as alleged in the
Buckwalter complaint: "AHP offered to settle the claims of all of the individual Fen-Phen plaintiffs
represented by NKB [Napoli] for a lump sum, provided that NKB would agree to stop its
recruitment of additional clients and halt its prosecution of those cases it had already filed on behalf
of existing clients. The lump sum settlement amount would be payable to NKB in installments, and
determination of settlement amounts for individual claims, and the distribution of those amounts,
would be left solely to the discretion of NKB." Id.at *2 (citations omitted). The complaint further
alleged that Napoli settled "the claims of individuals who were referred by other lawyers for lower
amounts than the claims of clients who had retained NKB directly in order to minimize the amounts
NKB paid in referral fees," and that the firm "engaged in a scheme to convince the individual
plaintiffs to accept the settlement amounts that they recommended through various pressure tactics,
including misleading and inaccurate letters, coercive telephone conversations and hotel room
I. at *3.
meetings with clients . " Id.
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(2) unknown to the claimants, their cases were not settled for an
amount negotiated for each claimant with AHP, rather their claims
were settled based upon the Napoli Firm's own evaluation of the value
of each claim in light of a lump sum offer; [and]
(3) the Special Master appointed by the settling court did not make
individual evaluations of the settlement offers in each case as was
represented by the Napoli Firm to its clients and to the settling
court ...

58

The court also provided information about the terms of Napoli's
settlement agreement with AHP:
This Court has read the sealed settlement agreement. It is clearly a
lump sum collective or aggregate settlement. The agreement itself is
complex (as were the steps leading up to it) but in essence it provides
that AHP agreed to pay a lump sum to the Napoli Firm, which sum was
described as "the sum of the individual settlement amounts listed in
Exhibit 3." One of the keys to understanding why this was an
aggregate or collective settlement is that Exhibit 3 which contained the
"individual settlement amounts" referred to in the settlement
agreement, did not exist at the time the agreement was entered into.
The amounts set forth in Exhibit 3 were not amounts negotiated for
each client with AHP. The "individual settlement amounts" were not
to be subsequently determined in the
known at the time, they were 59
process being challenged herein.
Like the Kentucky fen-phen settlement agreement, 60 Napoli's agreement
with AHP gave the plaintiffs' attorneys the responsibility of allocating
the settlement funds among the claimants.6'
The New York settlement as described by the court fits the
description of an all-or-nothing deal. Although "a few clients out of the
5,000 did not agree to settle, 62 the basic structure of the deal was 63that
"AHP agreed to pay a lump sum to settle with a group of claimants.
Although the federal court dismissed the class action on the grounds
that the claims were covered by an arbitration agreement, 64 the claims
58. Appel-Hole, 2007 WL 969426, at *2 (footnotes omitted).
59. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
60. Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement, supra note 26, at para. 5(A)-(B).
61. Appel-Hole, 2007 WL 969426, at *4.
62. Id. at *5.
63. Id.; see also id. at *9 ("The Napoli Firm appears to have been offered one lump sum of
money to settle all of its clients' cases who agreed to settle, provided a sufficient percentage agreed
(it is also not denied by the Napoli Firm that the number of clients increased after the offer, further
diluting the sum available for each claimant).").
64. Buckwalter v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 01 Civ. 10868LTSHB, 2005 WL 736216,
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against Napoli eventually gained traction as objections to the settlement
in the underlying diet drugs proceeding in New York state court. 65 The
New York judge ruled in 2007 "that a sufficient showing has been made
that the Napoli Firm may have violated the Disciplinary Rules and may
have made material misrepresentations in the Letter and the Form of
The judge appeared particularly troubled by the
Acceptance. 6 6
allegations that Napoli deceived its clients about whether the individual
settlement amounts had been negotiated with the defendant: "The
representation to a client that a specific dollar amount was offered in a
negotiation with the defendant to settle the client's case, when in fact the
settlement offer was by the client's own attorney made upon the
attorney's evaluation, if true, represents a serious breach of duty to the
client.",67 The court permitted the referring law firm to intervene and
ordered that the claims of misrepresentation and manipulation should be
determined at trial; 68 the order was affirmed on appeal. 69 The intervenor
complaint, filed in 2009, alleged that Napoli agreed to a lump-sum
settlement with AHP; 70 determined the allocations; 7 1 and assigned values
"fraudulently, unfairly, and unjustly" in order to maximize its net fees.72
The complaint further alleged, reminiscent of the Kentucky case, that the
total assigned values of the settlements left a remainder, which Napoli
failed to turn over to the settling clients.73 Adding insult to injury, in
at*9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005).
65. Appel-Hole, 2007 WL 969426, at *2. Earlier, in a separate lawsuit filed by the referring
law firm against Napoli, the New York Appellate Division rejected the claims as an improper
collateral attack on a previously approved settlement. Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 815 N.Y.S.2d
71, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
66. Appel-Hole, 2007 WL 969426, at * 11.
67. Id.at *9.
68. Id. at *11.
69. Appel-Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 850 N.Y.S.2d 408, 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
70. Intervenor Complaint of Parker Waichman, LLP at para. 41, Appel-Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs., No. 700000/98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 2009) ("Upon information and belief, the resolution
involved payment by AHP of lump sum amounts to Intervenor Defendants for discontinuing
substantially all of their cases.").
71. Id.at para. 42 ("The amounts paid by AHP to settle the cases of diet drug plaintiffs were
paid into several 'buckets' for settlement purposes rather than AHP allocating a specific amount for
each Settled Client's case."); id. at para. 43 ("Upon information and belief, individual settlement
amounts for each client were determined and then assigned by Intervenor Defendants.").
72. Id.at para. 44 ("Upon information and belief, Intervenor Defendants determined individual
settlement amounts by fraudulently, unfairly, and unjustly assigning a settlement value to Direct
Cases far above their actual worth and assigning a settlement value to cases referred from other
attorneys, including the Referred Cases for amounts less than their actual worth."); id. at para. 45
("Upon information and belief, Intervenor Defendants determined individual awards by fraudulently,
unfairly, and unjustly assigning value to Direct Cases referred to them by certain attorneys far above
the value assigned to cases referred from other attorneys, including the Referred Cases.").
73. Id. atpara. 47 ("Upon information and belief, Intervenor Defendants assigned values to
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2009 Napoli's malpractice insurer filed a lawsuit to avoid defending and
indemnifying the firm in the dispute over the fen-phen settlement.74
The brouhaha over Napoli's fen-phen settlement, like the trouble in
Kentucky, depended on the lump-sum nature of the deal. By giving the
plaintiffs' attorneys control over the allocation, the agreement set up the
opportunity for abuse. One accusation-the primary basis of the
referring law firm's claim against Napoli-grew out of lawyer-client and
client-client conflicts of interest, in which lawyers have an interest in
shifting settlement funds to directly retained clients rather than to
75
referred clients in order to minimize referral fees to other law firms.
Another accusation concerned reservation of money from the settlement
amount.76 These are problems that can arise only when plaintiffs'
lawyers are given the responsibility of allocating settlement funds among
their clients.
Other accusations concerned tactics to secure near-unanimous client
participation in the settlement. Napoli was accused of using highpressure techniques to coerce clients to accept the settlement.77 It was
accused, as well, of deceiving clients into believing that their settlement
amounts were individually negotiated with the defendant and
individually reviewed by the special master. 78 These issues arise when
settlements seek to bind nearly all members of the client group.
C. The Locks Fen-Phen Settlement
The diet drug litigation proved to be fertile ground for ethical
disputes after AHP approached plaintiffs' law firms around the country
their existing inventory of Direct and Referred diet drug cases which left a balance of money
remaining in possession of Intervenor Defendants from the gross settlement amounts paid by
AHP."); id. at para. 49 ("Intervenor Defendants, instead of allocating the balance to existing clients,
sought to attract new direct clients by, among other things, posting a message on the internet ...that
it was the 'Last Chance for a Cash Award for Fen-Phen Cases' and that '[Napoli] can settle your
case now, today."'); id. at para. 50 ("Upon information and belief, none of the 'Excess Settlement
Funds' were paid to the then existing clients and their referring attorneys with respect to the Referred
Cases .... "); see also supra text accompanying notes 18-53 (discussing the Kentucky fen-phen
settlement).
74. Complaint at 9-10, Westport Ins. Corp. v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, 09-Civ-7433
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).
75. See infra Part III.A (discussing conflict of interest problems).
76. See infra Part IIL.D (discussing slush fund problem).
77. Buckwalter v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. OlCiv.10868LTSHBP, 2005 WL 736216,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005).
78. Appel-Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. (In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig.), No. 700000/98, 2007 WL
969426, at **2, 9-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 2007), ajffd, 850 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008);
see also infra Part IIF (discussing informed consent problem).
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to negotiate settlements of each firm's inventory of cases. 79 These
settlements dealt with the claims of tens of thousands of diet drug
plaintiffs who opted out of the national settlement class action.
In New Jersey, a dispute over a fen-phen settlement erupted as a
battle between a fired lawyer and her former firm. 80 The underlying
allegations of misconduct against the firm strongly resembled certain
allegations against the Kentucky lawyers and Napoli-that the firm
withheld funds from the individual settlement amounts to adjust offers as
necessary to secure clients' acceptance, and that the firm misallocated
funds to maximize its own fees and avoid referral fees.81
Melissa Morris was a lawyer at Greitzer & Locks (Locks).82 When
she joined Locks, she brought one fen-phen client, Alan Weber. 83 Morris
became enmeshed in a dispute with her firm over the settlement of
Weber's claim.84 Morris sued Locks under New Jersey's Conscientious
Employee Protection Act, 85 claiming that she was fired in retaliation for
threatening to report the firm's unethical conduct in handling the
settlement.86 A trial court granted summary judgment for Locks, but the
appellate division reversed, finding that Morris had stated a valid claim
87
and that the disputed facts must be determined by a jury.
No definitive account of the facts is available, but Morris's version is
spelled out in the appellate court's review of a summary judgment ruling.
According to Morris, a Locks firm partner, James Pettit, told Morris that

79. See Mark Hamblett, Firm Accused of Intimidating Clients in Fen-Phen Litigation, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 12, 2001, at 1; Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Stick to the Trial Plan: Breast Implant Litigation
Taught Mike GallagherHow to Handle Fen-Phen Cases, TEX. LAW., Jan. 31, 2000, at 19; David J.
Morrow, American Home to Settle Some 1,400 Fen-Phen Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at C2;
see also Stephanie Saul, Fen-Phen Case Lawyers Say They'll Reject Wyeth Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2005, at C5 (reporting that Wyeth offered a comprehensive settlement to resolve 63,000 claims
with individual amounts ranging from $5000 to $200,000; according to the article, numerous
plaintiffs' law firms agreed to the deal but several firms representing thousands of claimants refused
to sign on).
80. Morris v. Greitzer & Locks of N.J., L.L.C., No. A-4672-OGT3, 2009 WL 2525452, at **1,
4-5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 20, 2009).
81. Id. at *6.
82. Locks was a major player in the fen-phen litigation; name partner Gene Locks was one of
seven lawyers appointed as class counsel in the nationwide settlement class action. Brown v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *44
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000), enforcement denied,No. 99-20593, 2003 WL 22594339 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10,
2003). In addition, the Locks firm was one of the two lead plaintiffs' firms in the Amchem asbestos
settlement class action. Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 709 (3d Cir. 1993).
83. Morris, 2009 WL 2525452, at *3.
84. Id. at **4-5.
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 to -8 (West 2000).
86. Morris, 2009 WL 2525452, at *5.
87. Id. at ** 18-19.
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he had settled the firm's diet drug cases, including Weber's, but he
would not tell her the exact amount of the settlement. 88 The next piece of
Morris's account raises the slush fund concern:
Pettit told plaintiff that he was withholding ten percent of each dietdrug client's settlements in case any one or more of them objected to
the amount of their settlement. [Morris] understood this to mean Pettit
would use this money to remold objecting clients' settlement amounts.
When [Morris] asked Pettit
8 9 if this was ethical, he replied, "Melissa, I
am doing the best I can."
According to Morris, Pettit initially told her that Weber's settlement
amount would be more than four times the amount Weber had
authorized, but later Pettit reduced the amount to three times the
authorized amount. 90 Just as Napoli in New York was charged with
misallocating settlement funds to minimize referral fees, 9 1 Morris
"alleged Pettit reduced the amount of Weber's settlement after he learned
92
she was asserting a claim for a share of [Locks's] counsel fees."
Morris claimed that she "challenged the legal and ethical propriety of
the manner in which the diet-drug cases were settled and the reduction to
the amount of Weber's settlement. [Morris] stated she would report the
improprieties. 9 3 Morris claimed that when it became clear that she was
going to be fired, she removed her files and brought the Conscientious
Employee Protection Act claim against Locks.94 The outcome remains to
be seen.
D. The Leeds Morelli Settlements
Not all troublesome aggregate settlements involve product liability
or mass torts. The law firm of Leeds, Morelli & Brown ("Leeds
Morelli") faced lawsuits from former clients alleging that the firm
mishandled settlements of employment claims against Prudential Life
Insurance Company, 95 Nextel Communications,9 6 Prudential Securities,97
88. Id. at *3.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Buckwalter v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 01Civ.10868LTSHBP, 2005 WL 736216,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005).
92. Morris, 2009 WL 2525452, at *5.
93. Id. at *4.
94. Id.
95. See Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 897 A.2d 362, 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2006).
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Penguin Group, 98 and Bear Stearns. 99 Leeds Morelli represented
numerous employees of these companies in potential claims including
wrongful discharge and employment discrimination. The firm negotiated
deals with the companies to resolve its clients' claims. The deals were
structured to resolve all or nearly all of the Leeds Morelli clients' claims
and to terminate Leeds Morelli's representation of plaintiffs against these
defendants. The settlements became the subject of controversy when
some clients, lawyers, and ethics experts argued that the deals created
impermissible conflicts of interest and raised other ethical problems.
The settlement with Prudential Life Insurance Company gave rise to
three lawsuits against Leeds Morelli. Leeds Morelli represented 359
Prudential employees who accused the company of wrongful conduct,
including pressuring agents not to sell insurance to minorities. 100 After
Leeds Morelli negotiated a settlement with Prudential to resolve all of its
clients' claims, some of those clients turned around and accused the law
firm of selling them out.' 01 The essential allegations are described in this
account of Lederman v. PrudentialLife Insurance Co.:
According to the complaint, Prudential targeted 359 employees for
dismissal in 1999 but had reason to believe they might file wrongful
discharge suits. And the workers, particularly agents like Lederman,
had reason to sue: They were facing dismissal for complaining about
redlining and other abuses by Prudential, the complaint says.
So the company reached agreement with Leeds Morelli, which
represented some of the employees, to call in the American Arbitration
Association or equivalent neutrals to arbitrate claims by the 359 in
secret. The employees went along, though whether they actually signed
the pact remains a fact question.
On its face, the agreement seemed like a good deal for all. The
employees, most of whom were at will, would have a forum to argue
for severance pay and Prudential would pay their fees.

96. Johnson v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., No. 07 CV 8473(GBD), 2009 WL 928131 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2009).
97. Vaughn v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., No. 04 Civ 8391(DLC), 2005 WL 1949468, at
*'1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2005), aff'd, 315 F. App'x 327 (2d Cir. 2009).
98. Ficklin v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., No. L-3765-03, 2007 WL 560983, at *1 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Feb. 26, 2007).
99. See Lee v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown, No. 8651/05 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. Mar. 22, 2005).
100. Lederman, 897 A.2d at 378.
101. Seeid. at378-79.
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The company would avoid the potential embarrassment of court claims,
including whistleblower suits alleging corporate wrongdoing. And it
would avoid big payouts.
Lederman alleged in his suit, filed in November 2002, that Leeds
Morelli and Prudential had reached a side agreement to cap the
settlements at $15 million, of which Leeds Morelli would receive onethird. That, the suit said, was fraud and commercial bribery that
violated the rules of professional conduct and fooled0 2the workers into
thinking the ADR process would protect their rights.1
The allegations in Lederman were echoed in lawsuits filed by
another former Prudential employee and Leeds Morelli client: Linda
Guyden. In federal court, Guyden sought to vacate the award she
received pursuant to the deal that Leeds Morelli had negotiated. 103 In a
state court case that was later consolidated with Lederman, Guyden sued
10 4
Leeds Morelli for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and malpractice.
The trial court ordered the plaintiffs to arbitration, but the appellate court
reversed in 20060 5and, as of 2009, the lawsuits against Leeds Morelli were
going forward.1
Leeds Morelli's deal with Nextel Communications gave rise to even
greater controversy. The law firm represented 587 claimants with
employment-related claims against the company.10 6 Leeds Morelli and
Nextel reached a Dispute Resolution and Settlement Agreement similar
to the agreement the firm reached with Prudential.10 7 The Nextel
settlement became the focus of heated debate when two leading legal
ethics professors aired their disagreements about the role of ethics
experts in the case.' 0 8
102. Henry Gottlieb, Whistleblower Alleges Conspiracy Between Plaintiffs Attorneys and
Employer Voids Arbitration Agreement, N.J. L.J. (Apr. 13, 2006), available at http://www.law.com
/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=90000545160; see also Lederman, 897 A.2d at 376-78.
103. Guyden v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., of Am., No. 08-3108, 2009 WL 1566792, at *1 (3d Cir.
Jun. 5, 2009).
104. Mary Pat Gallagher, Bias PlaintiffSays Lawyer Sell-Out Warrants Vacating ofArbitration,
N.J. L.J. (Apr. 8, 2008).
105. See Carmen Juri, Legal Fight Between Prudential,Ex-Employees Rolls on Dozens of
Motions Prompt Another Continuancein Years-Long Lawsuit, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr.
20, 2009; Martha Neil, Former Employees Say Insurer May Have Paid Their Lawyer $5 Million,
ABA JOURNAL ONLINE, Apr. 20, 2009.

106. Johnson v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., No. 07 CV 8473 (GBD), 2009 WL 928131, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,2009).
107. Idat**1-2.
108.

See William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional

Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1555 (2008) [hereinafter Simon, The
Marketfor Bad Legal Advice]; Bruce A. Green, The Marketfor Bad Legal Scholarship: William H.
Simon's Experiment in ProfessionalRegulation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1605 (2008); William H. Simon,
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The settlement agreement set up a dispute resolution process for the
entire group of Leeds Morelli clients with claims against Nextel.10 9 In
exchange for resolution of the claims through the new process, Leeds
Morelli agreed that the claimants' lawsuits and agency proceedings
against Nextel would be dismissed. 10° A few Leeds Morelli clients-9
out of 587--elected not to participate in the settlement." 1 The language
of the agreement, however, leaves no doubt that the parties' intent was to
include every one of the clients in the deal. The agreement listed all of
the clients who had retained Leeds Morelli to represent them in pursuing
employment claims against Nextel." 2 The law firm agreed that it did not
represent any other clients with employment claims against Nextel nor
did it intend to do so." 3 The time frames were written with the
expectation that all of the listed claimants would be included in the deal,
and the agreement imposed penalties on Leeds Morelli for failure to meet
those time frames:
LM&B agrees that the claims of all Claimants will be processed and
either resolved or fully submitted to arbitrators for decision [by the
DRP Conclusion Date].... If all claims presented by all Claimants
have not been processed and either resolved or fully submitted to
arbitrators for decision in Binding Arbitration by the DRP Conclusion
Date, Nextel may (i) withhold payment of any remaining installments
to LM&B until all claims presented by all Claimants have been
processed and resolved and (ii) deduct from the final installment
payment to LM&B $50,000 for each month after the DRP Conclusion
Date that the processing and either resolution or full submission to
arbitrators for decision in Binding Arbitration of all claims presented
by all Claimants has not occurred .... 114

Transparency is the Solution, Not the Problem: A Reply to Bruce Green, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1673
(2008).
109. Johnson, 2009 WL 928131, at *1.
110. Id. at** 1-2.
111. See Letter from Gregory 1. Rasin to Jeffrey K. Brown 1 (Aug. 29, 2001) (listing nine
claimants who "voluntarily opted out of the DRP pursuant to Amendment No. 2 to the Agreement").
112. Dispute Resolution and Settlement Agreement Between Nextel Communications and
Leeds, Morelli & Brown para. l(a) (Sept. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Nextel Settlement Agreement],
available at

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/wsimon/pdf/LMB%2OMaterials%20referred%20to%

20in%20the%OStanford%20article.pdf.; see also id. Schedule I ("LM&B represents that each
current or former employee of the Companies or Job Seeker represented by LM&B is listed below,
and that each such listed person has retained LM&B to represent him/her to pursue claims (other
than worker's compensation claims) against the Companies arising from his/her current or former
employment by the Companies or attempt to obtain employment with the Companies.").
113.
114.

Id. para. 1(c).
Id. para. 11 (b).
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Moreover, the very structure of the deal, particularly the consultancy that
Leeds Morelli would enter with Nextel, assumed that the firm would no
longer represent plaintiffs with claims against Nextel after the settlement
was concluded: "Immediately upon completion of the processing and
resolution of all claims presented by all Claimants, time being of the
essence, LM&B shall be available to be retained and Nextel will retain
LM&B, for a period of two years thereafter, as a legal consultant to the
For this largely undefined
Companies ....
16 assignment, Leeds
Morelli would be paid $2 million over two years.'
In addition to the $2 million for the consultancy, Nextel agreed to
pay Leeds Morelli a total of $5.5 million to cover attorneys' fees for the
settlement. 117 The agreement stated that Nextel would pay Leeds Morelli
$2 million within three days after Leeds Morelli delivered signed
agreements from all of the claimants, $1.5 million when half of the
claims had been resolved, "and the remaining $2 million upon the
processing and resolution of all remaining claims of all Claimants."" 8
A number of clients pursued lawsuits against Leeds Morelli claiming
that by entering the deal with Nextel, the law firm breached its duties to
its clients. A class action against Leeds Morelli in Colorado state court
was settled, although the terms of the settlement are not public. 19 Two
clients who opted out of the first class action filed their own suit against
the law firm; they lost in a jury trial.' 20 The third case, Johnson v. Nextel
Communications, a class action against both Leeds Morelli and Nextel,
was filed in New Jersey state court but was removed and transferred to
the Southern District of New York.121 The lawyer for the Johnson class
claims against Leeds
also represented the Lederman plaintiffs in their
22
Morelli concerning the Prudential settlement.1
At their core, the former clients' claims against Leeds Morelli were
about collusion. In both the Prudential cases and the Nextel cases, the
employees who had been represented by Leeds Morelli complained that

115. Id. para. 12.
116. Id. para. 12 ("Nextel will pay LM&B a consultancy fee of $83,333.34 per month for 24
months for such services.").
117. Id. at para. 11(a).
118. Id.para.11(a).
119. See Simon, The Marketfor Bad Legal Advice, supra note 108, at 1578 n.75 (noting that the
record in Foster v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown, No. 02-CV-1484 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2002), has been sealed
and no one is permitted to discuss the terms of the settlement).
120. Id.
121. Johnson v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., No. 06-CV-5547 (DMC), 2007 WL 2814649, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2007).
122. Gallagher, supra note 104.
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their law firm's loyalty was compromised by a deal the firm struck with
the opposition.1 23 Instead of representing the employees with undivided
loyalty, the former clients claimed, the firm forged a mutually
advantageous relationship with its clients' adversaries.
The essence of Plaintiffs' claims against their former lawyers is that,
pursuant to an agreement ...Nextel bribed the attorneys to
compromise Plaintiffs' claims against Nextel on terms favorable to
Nextel.... The foundation of many of the claims asserted against the
Attorney Defendants is that there were secret payments made by Nextel
to LM & B
24 and that the entire structure of the ADR process ...was
unethical. 1
Leeds Morelli contended that the arrangement was advantageous for its
clients. The concern that gave rise to so many lawsuits, however, was
that Leeds Morelli's interests in the deal aligned with those of the
defendants and diverged from the interests of its own clients. Leeds
Morelli, the lawsuits claimed, struck deals in which the firm stood to
gain millions of dollars on the condition that it could persuade its clients
to participate in the settlement. As one of the former Prudential
employees put it, "If your
attorney is colluding with the person you are
' 125
problem."
a
that's
suing,
1 26

E. The Vioxx Settlement

The Merck pharmaceutical company, facing mass litigation over its
painkiller Vioxx, negotiated an agreement in 2007 with a group of
plaintiffs' lawyers to resolve the claims of about 50,000 plaintiffs for
$4.85 billion.12 ' The deal came after several years of hard-fought
litigation over claims that the drug caused heart attacks and strokes.
On the surface, the Vioxx deal was not all-or-nothing. It was
structured as an 85% walkaway deal.' 2 8 In other words, the agreement
provided that Merck could terminate the deal unless it received releases

123. Id; Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 897 A.2d 362, 366 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006).
124.
125.

Johnson, 2007 WL 2814649, at *1.
Juri, supra note 105.

126. For a discussion of the Vioxx settlement as an attempt to obtain closure in a mass tort
settlement, see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2.
127. See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the
Signature Pages Hereto (Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement Agreement], available at
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement Agreement.pdf.
128.

Id.§ 1.1.
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from at least 85% of the claimants in certain categories as well as 85% of
the claimants overall. 129 Other terms of the agreement, however,
rendered this walkaway clause almost entirely superfluous and made the
deal an all-or-nothing proposition for each law firm that represented
Vioxx plaintiffs. 130 For a law firm to participate-that is, for any of its
clients to get compensation through the settlement-the law firm was3
obligated to recommend the settlement to all of its eligible clients., '
Moreover, if any clients chose not to participate in the settlement, the
lawyer was required to withdraw from representing the non-settling
clients. 132 Any client who declined the settlement faced the prospect of
losing a lawyer and finding that every other lawyer handling Vioxx
claims was unavailable. Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of
eligible claimants decided to participate in the settlement. 133
The mandatory recommendation provision took the form of an
affirmation by plaintiffs' counsel: "By submitting an Enrollment Form,
the Enrolling Counsel affirms that he has recommended, or... will
recommend by no later than [the deadline], to 100% of the Eligible
Counsel that such Eligible
Claimants represented by such 1Enrolling
34
Claimants enroll in the Program.',

This mandatory recommendation provision was immediately
followed by the real kicker, the mandatory withdrawal provision:
If any such Eligible Claimant disregards such recommendation, or for
any other reason fails (or has failed) to submit a non-deficient and nondefective Enrollment Form on or before [the deadline] ...

such

enrolling counsel shall.., to the extent permitted by the equivalents to
Rules 1.16 and 5.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
the relevant jurisdiction(s), (i) take ...all necessary steps to disengage
and withdraw from the representation of such Eligible Claimant and to
forego any Interest in such Eligible Claimant and (ii) cause.. . each
other Enrolling Counsel, and each other counsel with an Interest in any
which has an Interest in such Eligible
Enrolled Program Claimant,
35
Claimant to do the same.

129. Id.
130. Seeid §§ 1.2.8.1-1.2.8.2.

131. Id.§ 1.2.8.1.
132.
133.

Id. § 1.2.8.2.
See Claims Administrator Court Report No. 13 (Dec. 19, 2008) at 2, available at

www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement/images/pdfs/mdlreport_121908.pdf (reporting that 99.79% of
eligible claimants had enrolled).
134.

Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 127, § 1.2.8.1.

135. Id. § 1.2.8.2.
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These two provisions made the Vioxx settlement a bundle of firmby-firm all-or-nothing deals, notwithstanding the overall requirement of
85% participation. Lest there be any doubt that the signatories intended
the deal to function as a set of firm-by-firm all-or-nothing settlements,
the agreement made the goal explicit: "The parties agree that a key
objective of the Program is that, with respect to any counsel with an
Interest in the claims of any Enrolled Program Claimant, all other
Eligible Claimants in which
such counsel has an Interest shall be
136
enrolled in the Program."'

Samuel Issacharoff framed the challenge of the Vioxx settlement in
part as a response to Amchem and Ortiz:
The difficult issue was how to create an effective bill of peace that
would bring a reasonable (and reasonably certain) end to the litigation,
enabling the plaintiffs to be compensated and Merck to obtain closure.
A publicly ordered settlement through the use of a class action was too
unwieldy because of the elevated burdens on organizing a class after
Amchem and Ortiz ....

The unusual provisions in the Vioxx settlement, in Issacharoff s view,
offered a firm-by-firm guarantee of comprehensiveness:
The novel feature of the settlement was that while the offer was made
to each Vioxx plaintiff individually, the offer was only valid if accepted
by all the clients represented by any particular attorney or law firm. In
order to provide closure, however-and to substitute for the inability to
use effectively the class action device. . .- the offer required any
participating lawyer to certify that all his or her clients had agreed to
the terms. In broad outlines, the offer provided closure with each firm
independently (subject to an overall 85 percent
acceptance rate to be
38
effective) or it would not become effective. 1
As soon as the deal was announced, legal ethicists voiced concerns
39
that the deal violated the plaintiffs' lawyers' duties to their clients.'
136. Id.§ 1.2.7. See also id.Recital G ("A key objective of the Program is that, with respect to
any counsel with an Interest in the claims of any Enrolled Program Claimant, all other Eligible
Claimants in which such counsel has an Interest shall be enrolled in the Program.").
137. Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 217.
138. Id.at 218.
139. See, e.g., Daniel Costello, Vioxx Deal May Cause Pain, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at CI;
Nathan Koppel, Vioxx Plaintiffs' Choice: Settle or Lose Their Lawyer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2007,
at B 1;Adam Liptak, In Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer's Loyalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2008, at A12; Anthony Sebok & Benjamin Zipursky, Getting with the Program: The Vioxx
Settlement, FINDLAW, Nov. 20, 2007, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/sebok/20071120.htmi. These early
critics included myself. See Posting of Howard M. Erichson to the Mass Tort Litigation Blog,

2010]

THE TROUBLE WITH ALL-OR-NOTHING SETTLEMENTS

1003

The mandatory recommendation provision, critics contended, violated
the duty to give independent and loyal advice.' 40 The mandatory
withdrawal provision, they said, violated the duty not to restrict one's
law practice as part of a settlement,' 14 disregarded the constraints on
termination of the lawyer-client relationship, 142 and contravened the
principle that
the decision of whether to accept a settlement belongs to
43
the client.
When some of the plaintiffs' lawyers challenged the deal in court
and asked for a declaratory judgment that the mandatory
recommendation
and mandatory withdrawal provisions were
4
4
unenforceable, 1 Merck and the negotiating plaintiffs' lawyers agreed to
amend the agreement by adding the following language: "Each Enrolling
Counsel is expected to exercise his or her independent judgment in the
best interest of each client individually before determining whether to
recommend enrollment in the Program."' 145 The amendment removed
neither the mandatory recommendation provision nor the mandatory
withdrawal provision, 146 but apparently
it satisfied the objecting lawyers
14 7
sufficiently to end the matter.
The Connecticut Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics
issued an ethics opinion about the Vioxx settlement's mandatory
recommendation and mandatory withdrawal clauses, concluding that
both provisions were unethical:

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/masstortlitigation/2007/ 1/the-vioxx-settl.html (Nov. 10, 2007).
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2), 2.1 (2009).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2009). The agreement anticipates this
objection, stating that "nothing in this Agreement is intended to operate as a 'restriction' on the right
of any Claimant's counsel to practice law within the meaning of the equivalent to Rule 5.6(b) of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in any jurisdiction in which Claimant's Counsel
practices or whose rules may otherwise apply." Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 127, §
1.2.8.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2009). One report quoted legal ethics expert
Stephen Gillers on the illegality of the Vioxx agreement's mandatory withdrawal provision: "This is
a black-and-white issue.... Clients are not inventory that lawyers can just shed when they become
inconvenient. It's forbidden." Costello, supra note 139.
143.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2009) (requiring informed consent for aggregate settlements).
144. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Certain Plaintiffs' and Their Counsels' Motion for
Declaratory Judgment that Certain Provisions of the Settlement Agreement are Unenforceable, In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2008) (No. 1657), 2008 WL 83836.
145. See Heather Won Tesoriero, Merck's ProspectsBrightenfor Vioxx Settlement, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 19, 2008, at A3.
146. Id.("Lawyers for both sides said this is a point of clarification but not a substantive
change.").
147. Id. (reporting that the attorneys "appear to have been mollified" by the amendment and had
withdrawn their motions or indicated their intention to do so).
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One provision compels plaintiffs' counsel to give the same advice to all
of her clients. The other, to the extent permitted by Rule 1.16 and Rule
5.6, compels her to withdraw from representing clients who reject her
advice to settle. In our opinion, for the reasons set forth below, both
provisions compel lawyers to violate the Rules of Professional

Conduct. 148

First, the opinion explained that the mandatory recommendation
provision asked plaintiffs' lawyers to "do the impossible," because a
lawyer cannot provide independent professional judgment to each client
149
if the agreement restricts the advice that the lawyer may give.
"Applying [i]ndependent professional judgment," the opinion says, "she
may believe that some clients should accept the settlement while others
should reject it."' 150 Turning to the mandatory withdrawal provision, the
Connecticut opinion emphasized that "a lawyer may not threaten to
withdraw1 or withdraw from a case because the client rejects a settlement
15
offer.'
F.

The Phillips Chemical PlantSettlement

After a series of explosions at a Phillips 66 chemical plant in Texas
killed twenty-three workers and injured hundreds of others, 126 of the
victims retained a group of leading mass tort lawyers-Umphrey,
Burrow, Reaud, Williams & Bailey ("Umphrey Burrow")-to pursue
wrongful death and personal injury claims. 5 2
Umphrey Burrow
negotiated a settlement of these claims for approximately $190 million
and received a contingent fee of more than $60 million. 53 A number of
the plaintiffs then filed ethics grievances and a civil lawsuit against the
Umphrey Burrow lawyers, claiming that the lawyers 54 engaged in
professional misconduct in connection with the settlement.
Burrow v. Arce became a hot button among mass litigators and legal
ethicists because of the Texas Supreme Court's holding that a lawyer's
breach of fiduciary duty may result in fee forfeiture even without proof
of actual damages. 55 For purposes of this Article, however, the case is
148.
under a
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Conn. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 08-01 (Feb. 20, 2008) (Obligations of Plaintiffs' Counsel
Particular Aggregate Settlement Agreement).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. 1999).
id.
Id.

155. Id. at239-40.
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significant not as a ruling about remedies, but rather as an example of an
all-or-nothing settlement gone awry.
In the lawsuit, forty-nine of the former Umphrey Burrow clients sued
the lawyers for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, deceptive trade practices,
negligence, and breach of contract. 56 The court of appeals described the
plaintiffs' contentions:
According to [the plaintiffs], [the Umphrey Burrow lawyers] did not

develop or evaluate their claims individually, and instead, without
discussion or authority, reached an "aggregate settlement" with Phillips
for the entire suit. Only then were [the plaintiffs] "summoned" for a
brief, twenty-minute meeting to discuss the settlement arrangements.
[The plaintiffs] allege [that the Umphrey Burrow lawyers] lied, and/or
intimidated them into accepting the settlement and in the process,
"skimmed-off' sixty million dollars in attorneys' fees. 157
A news report based on interviews with plaintiffs fleshes out the
accusations, including the charge that some clients were offered

additional money when they objected to the initial amounts offered:
Umphrey Burrow lawyers had relatively little contact with their 126

clients-none, in some cases-until all were summoned to the firm's

offices in late February 1991 to hear that Phillips had offered to settle
for sums from $25,000 to $9.5 million.
Court documents and interviews with plaintiffs show that in
meetings scheduled to last just 20 minutes, each was urged to take the
money. Twenty-six plaintiffs who objected were offered larger sums.
Some plaintiffs said they were warned that Umphrey Burrow would not

pursue their cases in court. Others said they were also told that if they
sought other counsel, Umphrey Burrow would still be entitled to a third
of their compensation under the contingency contract.

In the end, all but a handful agreed to settle for a sum158
totaling $190
million, of which Umphrey Burrow received $65 million.

156. Id. at 232.
157. Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. App. 1997), aff'd in relevant part, 997 S.W.2d
229 (Tex. 1999); see also Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 232 ("The plaintiffs contend: .... The attorneys
settled all the claims in the aggregate and allocated dollar figures to the plaintiffs without regard to
individual conditions and damages. No plaintiff was allowed to meet with an attorney for more than
about twenty minutes, and any plaintiff who expressed reservations about the settlement was
threatened by the attorney with being afforded no recovery at all.").
158. Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6.
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The allegations in Burrow raised many of the issues that have come
up in connection with other all-or-nothing settlements. The Burrow
plaintiffs accused their lawyers of carelessness in allocating settlement
funds.' 59 While disenchanted clients may accuse lawyers of carelessness
even in individual settlement negotiations, the charge rings truer in mass
aggregate settlements where a lawyer's fee is based on the total amount
and thus the financial incentive does not encourage expending significant
resources on determining a fair allocation. Beyond careless allocation,
the Burrow plaintiffs accused their lawyers of a particular form of
misallocation: raising offers to clients who objected to initial settlement
amounts. 160 Reminiscent of charges concerning fen-phen settlements,
this type of misallocation is problematic both because it involves a
client-client conflict of interest and because it involves deceptive conduct
if the lawyers conveyed "offers" to their clients as if those offers came
from the defendant.' 6 1 Finally, the Burrow plaintiffs accused their
lawyers of pressuring them to accept the settlement while failing to
disclose the full scope of the deal. In other words, like the clients in a
number of other all-or-nothing settlements, these plaintiffs accused their
lawyers of failing to 1obtain
the clients' genuine informed consent to the
62
aggregate settlement.

The Umphrey Burrow lawyers initially won summary judgment on
the grounds that the plaintiffs could not show actual damages, but the
Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that fee forfeiture could be a
remedy for a lawyer's breach of fiduciary duty even without actual
damages. 63 Three of the Umphrey Burrow lawyers settled with the
plaintiffs while the appeal was pending, 64 and the remaining claims65 were
settled after the Texas Supreme Court decision was handed down.
III. THE PROBLEMS OF ALL-OR-NOTHING SETTLEMENTS
At least seven types of problems arise from all-or-nothing
settlements: (1) conflict of interest problems, (2) allocation problems, (3)
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See infra Part III.D (discussing the slush fund problem).
162. See infra Part 1I1.F (discussing the informed consent problem).
163. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 229, 240 (Tex. 1999).
164. ld. at 234.
165. Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-49658, 2000 WL 35633123, at *1 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000)
("The parties appeared in Court and announced that they had settled this case for a confidential
amount (said sum having been disclosed to the Court) subject only to the Court's approval of the
settlement of four claims pursued on behalf of four minor children [, which the court approved].").
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the holdout problem, (4) the slush fund problem, (5) the loyalty problem,
(6) the informed consent problem, and (7) the collusion problem. These
problems overlap substantially, 66 and arguably the first categoryconflicts of interest-subsumes the rest. Some of these problems
(conflict of interest, allocation, informed consent) are fundamental
aspects of all-or-nothing settlements, while others (holdout, slush fund,
loyalty) suggest problems that may arise in some cases. The list is not
meant to be exhaustive. Nonetheless, breaking down the issues into
discrete types of problems is useful for understanding the pressures and
opportunities for abuse that arise when defendants insist that a settlement
include all or nearly all claimants.
A. Conflict of Interest Problems
At bottom, all of the problems with all-or-nothing settlements may
be understood as conflict of interest problems.
All-or-nothing
settlements create both client-client and lawyer-client conflicts of
interest.1 67 In the language of the Rules of Professional Conduct, such
conflicts of interest present "a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities
to another client ...or by a personal interest of the
168
lawyer."'

Allocation of settlement funds among a lawyer's clients presents a
client-client conflict. Any decision to give clients different settlement
amounts-or to give differently situated clients the same settlement
amount-necessarily involves choices that benefit some clients while
harming others. Similarly, if the settlement involves a matrix, points, or
categories, any decision about how to value a claim based on particular
injuries and other factors involves choices that benefit some clients while
harming others.' 69 This sort of conflict exists even if a lawyer negotiates
166. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch treats the holdout problem, client-client conflicts of interest,
lawyer-client conflicts of interest, and allocation issues as aspects of the broader problem of
"disunity." Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, LitigatingGroups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009).
167. See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1769, 1798 (2005) ("All-or-nothing deals present the most extreme form of conflict because they
give the lawyer a powerful incentive to pressure every client ...to accept the agreement.").
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2009).
169. See Erichson, supra note 167, at 1799-1806 (identifying collective allocation as a source of
conflicts of interest justifying the informed consent requirement of the aggregate settlement rule).
The comments to the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation
explain the importance of collective allocation:
[A]llocation is collective if the value of any claimant's claim is determined by a method
other than individual, claimant-by-claimant analysis. For example, an allocation is
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with the defendant to determine a detailed matrix of settlement values,
but the conflict appears in its rawest form when a defendant offers170a
lump sum and leaves it to the plaintiffs' counsel to allocate the money.
Not only do client-client conflicts arise from the allocation process in
aggregate settlements, they also arise from the requirement of including
all claimants in the deal) 71 When a settlement requires that all of a
lawyer's clients participate in the deal, it creates a conflict between those
clients who wish to accept the settlement and those who might otherwise
choose, or be advised, to decline the settlement. The decision of some
clients to decline the settlement impairs the ability of other clients to get
Client-client conflicts occur whenever a deal 7is
the deal done.
conditioned on terms that make clients' settlements interdependent.1 1
When a settlement contains a walkaway clause that conditions the deal
upon 85% or 90% participation, the conflict is relatively mild because of
the safety valve that permits a number of clients to decline the settlement
without blowing the deal for everyone else. When a settlement requires
100% participation, however, the client-client conflict makes it
extremely difficult for a lawyer to give unbiased counsel to a client who
wishes to decline the offer.
Even more worrisome than these client-client conflicts of interest,
all-or-nothing settlements create lawyer-client conflicts that present
collective whenever a defendant conditions the settlement of the claims of multiple
claimants and leaves to claimants' counsel the responsibility of proposing the allocation
of that money among the members of the group. When a defendant conditions its offer to
claimants' counsel to settle all existing claims on a lump-sum basis, the claims are
interdependent because the parties have not assessed the precise value of each claimant's
claim in arriving at the settlement figure. More realistically, the defendant's and
claimants' attorneys simply looked at the claims as a whole and negotiated a figure that
would compensate claimants with either an average award or an award based on a matrix
of categories (e.g., depending on the nature of the injuries). Because the settlement does
not reflect the value of each individual's claim, there is a possibility that the settlement
undervalues some claims relative to others, or in any other way fails to provide equity in
treatment among the affected claimants.
AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 5, § 3.16 cmt. c.
170. Erichson, supra note 167, at 1787-88, 1801.
171. Similarly, a provision that a lawyer must recommend a settlement to all or none of the
lawyer's clients creates a client-client conflict. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 08-01 (Feb. 20,
2008) ("The agreement requires the lawyer to treat her clients as if they had agreed to be part of a
group and to put the interests of the group above those of individual clients, a requirement that
creates a conflict of interest.").
172. See Erichson, supra note 167, at 1796-99 (identifying collective conditionality as a source
of conflicts of interest justifying the informed consent requirement of the aggregate settlement rule);
see also AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 5, § 3.16(b)(1), cmt. b (describing collective
conditionality as a form of interdependence in aggregate settlements); Tilzer v. Davis, Bethune &
Jones L.L.C., 204 P.3d 617, 629 (Kan. 2009) ("There was collective conditionality because the
pharmaceutical companies were granted the right to opt out of the settlement if fewer than all of the
covered plaintiffs accepted the proposed settlement.").
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significant opportunities and incentives for abuse. Some of these lawyerclient conflicts involve allocation. If a law firm agrees to pay referral
fees for certain clients but other clients retained the firm directly, the
firm has an interest in maximizing settlement amounts for the direct
clients. 73 In litigation over both the Napoli firm's fen-phen settlement in
New York and the Locks firm's fen-phen settlement in New Jersey, the
lawyers were accused of allocating
less settlement money to certain
17 4
clients to minimize referral fees.
Another lawyer-client conflict arises whenever a deal is conditioned
upon unanimity. All-or-nothing settlements pit the lawyer's interest in
closing the deal against the interests of any clients who might wish to
decline the settlement. If a lawyer has a one-third contingent fee
arrangement and negotiates a $100 million aggregate settlement on
behalf of a large group of clients, the lawyer stands to earn over $33
million if the deal goes through. If the deal is conditioned on full
participation, the lawyer's fee depends on each client's willingness to
settle. On the one hand, the lawyer has a duty to counsel each client
about the right to decline the settlement and about the possible
downsides of the deal, but on the other hand, the lawyer stands to lose
millions of dollars if any client says no. As with the client-client
conflict, this lawyer-client conflict may occur in any settlement
conditioned upon a given level of participation, but settlements with 90%
walkaway clauses or similar terms leave enough of a safety valve to
alleviate much of the problem. All-or-nothing provisions, or other terms
that push for near unanimity, exacerbate the conflict by putting the
lawyer's fee at risk if the lawyer fails to obtain every client's assent to
the deal. Arguably, a lawyer-client conflict exists whenever a contingent
fee lawyer advises a single client about a settlement because the lawyer's
fee may depend on the client's decision, but that level of conflict is
inherent in virtually every lawyer-client relationship. What makes the
all-or-nothing settlement troubling is the extent to which it ups the ante
173. See Erichson, supra note 167, at 1801-02 (describing how this situation can lead to lawyers
favoring some clients over others); Burch, supra note 166. Paul Rheingold explains the interests that
might lead to favoritism if settlement allocation is left to the plaintiffs' lawyer:
A law firm with a large inventory has some cases referred to it, whereby it has to give up
a forwarding fee. Other cases came directly from the client. The more the settlements
are paid to those who have no forwarder, the more the law firm makes. The law firm
will, therefore, be more inclined to favor those clients who came directly to the law firm.
Other examples of favoring one client over another include favoring a "squeaky wheel"
client, favoring a relative, or favoring a friend of the family.
Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass Tort Cases, 31 LOy.

L.A. L. REv. 395, 396-97 (1998).
174. See supra parts II.B and H.C.
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on the lawyer-client conflict by making the entire deal, and potentially
the lawyer's entire fee, subject to the decision of each individual client.
B. Allocation Problems
All-or-nothing settlements tend to saddle plaintiffs' lawyers with the
problem of allocating settlement funds. When the terms leave no
significant possibility that some plaintiffs will decline a settlement while
others accept it, the defendant has little reason to care about the
allocation among plaintiffs. From the defendant's perspective, it is a
lump-sum deal. Defendants in such settlements often explicitly disavow
any involvement in allocating settlement funds among the claimants.
The Kentucky fen-phen settlement agreement specified that
allocating the $200 million among the 441 claimants was "the sole
responsibility of the Settling Attorneys and the Settling Claimants."' 75
Similarly, Napoli agreed that the "determination of the individual
settlement amounts for each of the Settling Claimants will be set forth in
[a document prepared] by the Settling Attorneys ....
Defendants have at least two reasons to stay out of the allocation
business. First, allocation of settlement amounts can be a timeconsuming and expensive process; parties avoid that burden unless they
have a reason to undertake it. Second, a defendant in mass litigation
prefers not to be pinned to any individual settlement because the amount,
if known, might create expectations among other claimants who would
treat it as a floor in subsequent negotiations. For a defendant, allocation
ignorance is one of the luxuries of a lump-sum settlement. In a
settlement that contemplates incomplete participation, defendants cannot
entirely ignore allocation because savvy plaintiffs' attorneys could steer
funds to plaintiffs with weaker claims, while encouraging stronger
claimants to decline the settlement.
For the plaintiffs' lawyer, the job of allocating settlement funds is
problematic. The client-client conflict of interest is palpable; it is a zerosum game. Moreover, the typical contingent fee gives plaintiffs' lawyers
a strong incentive to maximize the total size of a settlement, but little
incentive to devote resources to ensuring a fair allocation of the funds
once the total size has been determined. Thus, when clients accused the
175. Kentucky Fen-Phen Settlement Agreement, supra note 26, para. 5(a); see also supra notes
30-31 and accompanying text.
176. Appel-Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. (In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig.), No. 700000/98, 2007 WL
969426, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 2007) (quoting section 5(a) of the settlement agreement),
affid, 850 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App. 2008); see also supra text accompanying note 61.
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Umphrey Burrow lawyers of carelessness in determining individual
amounts in the Phillips chemical plant settlement,177 the charge may have
resonated because the fee incentives in all-or-nothing settlements
encourage a certain amount of lawyer apathy concerning individual
allocations. Worse, the lawyer may have affirmative incentives to
misallocate, for example to minimize referral fees. Mediators and other
third parties are available to assist lawyers with allocation of aggregate
settlements, alleviating the allocation problems at least to some extent.
But third parties come at a price that not every settlement can justify.
C. The Holdout Problem
All-or-nothing settlements carry a risk of strategic holdouts. When a
settlement includes a clause that conditions the deal on acceptance by
every member of the group, a savvy client may withhold assent to extort
additional money. An attorney who succumbs to the extortion and
allocates additional money to holdout clients violates the lawyer's duty
to the remaining clients.
Charles Silver and Lynn Baker explain that a unanimous consent
requirement, by enabling strategic holdouts, creates a risk of
misallocation and gives disproportionate bargaining power to the least
deserving claimants:
Critically, this requirement enables a single plaintiff to block an allencompassing group deal unless he or she receives a disproportionately
large share of the available funds. A strategic plaintiff with little at
stake in a lawsuit, such as a person who was exposed to asbestos but
has no disease, can therefore make a credible threat to veto a desirable
group deal unless paid a disproportionately large amount. Because
large-claim plaintiffs, such as mesothelioma victims, usually have the
most urgent need for money as well as the most to lose (in terms of
both time and money) by trying their cases, they occupy a weak
bargaining position vis-A-vis small-claim plaintiffs and may have
difficulty resisting a small-claim plaintiff's extortion efforts. The
Rule's nonwaivable unanimity requirement creates an intra-group
bargaining game in which the most
178 deserving plaintiffs may often be at
the mercy of the least deserving.

177. See supra Part lt.F.
178. Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV.733, 767 (1997) [hereinafter Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule]; see
also Kerrie M. Brophy, Consent Waivers in Non-Class Aggregate Settlements: Respecting Risk
Preference in a Transactional Adjudication Model, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 680 (2009)
("Premium holdouts are one of the most concerning unintended consequences of the unanimity
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Strategic holdouts, unless steadfastly resisted, lead to problems of
misallocation and disloyalty. 179 In fen-phen settlements and in the
Phillips chemical plant settlement, lawyers were accused of using some
of the available settlement funds to increase offers for clients who
objected to their initial allocations. Strategies to minimize the risk of
holdouts, such as the mandatory withdrawal clause in the
Vioxx
180
settlement, may ensure participation at too great an ethical cost.
Silver and Baker present the holdout concern as a problem with the
aggregate settlement rule. 181 They describe the aggregate settlement rule,
which requires clients' informed consent to an aggregate settlement after
disclosure, 182 as a rule requiring "unanimous consent.' ' 183 This follows
from their assumption that aggregate settlements are, or ought to be, fully
inclusive. 184 Because they see global resolution as the ultimate objective,
they treat the holdout problem as a reason to permit advance consent to
aggregate settlements.1 85 The American Law Institute's Principlesof the
Law of Aggregate Litigation, proposing legal reforms that would permit
lawyers to obtain their clients' advance consent to aggregate
settlements, 186 picks up on Silver and Baker's reasoning that the
informed consent requirement gives individual clients veto power and
thus enables strategic holdouts:
Current law prohibits waiving individual-claimant settlement
decisionmaking, thereby empowering individual claimants to exercise
unfair control over a proposed settlement and to demand premiums in
exchange for approval.... Subsection (b) takes the view that giving

requirement in non-class aggregate settlement groups.").
179. It bears emphasizing that claimants decline to settle for many reasons. Claimants' litigation
objectives and risk tolerance vary, as does the value they place on their own claims. Not every
claimant who declines a settlement offer is a "holdout" in the strategic sense described here. In this
section, "the holdout problem" refers specifically to the risk that claimants may threaten to withhold
consent as a means to gain a disproportionate share of settlement funds. Both types of nonsettling
claimants, however, are problematic in the context of all-or-nothing settlements.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 126-51.
181. Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 178, at 767-68; see also Charles
Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement
Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REv. 1465, 1520, 1532 (1998) [hereinafter Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose].
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2009).
183. Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 178, at 767; see also Silver &
Baker, I Cut, You Choose, supra note 181, at 1469.
184. See Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule, supranote 178, at 767-68.
185. See id. at 768-70. Advance consent to aggregate settlements is impermissible under current
interpretations of the aggregate settlement rule. See Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d
892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975); Knisley v. City of Jacksonville, 497 N.E.2d 883, 886-89 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986); Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 522 (N.J. 2006).
186. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 5, § 3.17(b)-(e).
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is not
veto power to individual claimants (as opposed to collectively)
87
necessary to ensure the fairness of aggregate settlements.
Properly understood, the aggregate settlement rule is not a rule of
unanimous consent.18 8 It is a rule that insists that no client may be bound
by an aggregate settlement, unless that client gives informed consent
after full disclosure of the terms of the deal. 189 In an all-or-nothing
settlement, this informed consent requirement functions as a unanimity
rule.' 90 But in an aggregate settlement that does not require every
client's participation, the informed consent requirement does not
function as a unanimity rule. 19 1 The mistake of referring to the aggregate
settlement rule as a unanimity requirement, or as a rule that gives each
client "veto power" over the settlement, follows from the unwarranted
92
assumption that aggregate settlements must be all-or-nothing deals.'
Thus, the holdout problem should be understood not as a problem
with the aggregate settlement rule's requirement of informed consent, but
rather as a problem with deals that are structured to require full
participation. An aggregate settlement presents a risk of strategic
holdouts only if the settlement is conditioned upon acceptance by all, or
nearly all, of the claimants. A mass settlement with, say, a 90%
walkaway clause rather than an all-or-nothing clause entails no realistic
holdout risk because no individual client has the power to derail the deal.
Turning to the lawyer's role when dealing with strategic holdouts,
one might argue that holdouts would not present a problem if lawyers
had sufficient backbone to resist clients' unreasonable demands. On this
view, a lawyer faced with a client who tries to extort additional money
from an evenly allocated aggregate settlement should refuse to succumb
and should simply tell the client that the client is entitled to reject the
settlement if the client is unsatisfied. But that view, while probably a
correct account of how a lawyer ought to handle the strategic holdout
client, misses the structural point. It is much easier for a lawyer to tell an
unsatisfied client simply to reject a settlement when that rejection will
not ruin the entire deal for the lawyer and all of the other clients.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. § 3.17 cmt. b.
Erichson, supra note 167, at 1805.
Id.
Id. at 1805-06.
Id.at 1806.
See id. at 1805-06.
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D. The Slush FundProblem
When a defendant offers an appealing lump-sum settlement to
resolve a group of claims, the lawyer representing the claimants naturally
tries to get the deal done. Not only does the lawyer have an interest in
obtaining fees from the settlement, but as a loyal advocate, the lawyer
wishes to get the benefit of the deal for all of the clients. For a deal
conditioned on full participation, the lawyer needs every client's consent.
If some clients strategically hold out for more money or are simply
dissatisfied with their settlement amounts, the deal is at risk.
One plausible-though unethical-response to this risk is to reserve
some funds from the total settlement amount so that individual offers can
be sweetened as necessary to secure each client's participation. Suppose
a defendant offers $10 million to settle 100 claims, conditioned on full
participation, leaving the allocation to the plaintiffs' lawyer. The
plaintiffs' lawyer, worried about whether every client will say yes, might
devise an allocation of 100 individual settlement amounts totaling only
$8 million, keeping $2 million in reserve. The lawyer might then meet
with each client to convey the settlement amount based on the lawyer's
allocation. If a client says yes, the lawyer gets the client's signature. If a
client says no, then the lawyer increases the offer-or, more deceptively,
tells the client that the defendant has increased its offer-until the client
says yes.
The most egregious example of an aggregate settlement slush fund is
the Kentucky fen-phen settlement. There, the lawyers were convicted
not merely of keeping money in reserve to ensure full participation, but
of taking additional money for themselves out of the funds that had been
set aside.1 93 In other settlements, law firms were accused of reserving
funds from initial allocations in order to increase individual amounts as
necessary to gain every client's participation. 194
Even if lawyers do not use the excess funds to overpay themselves,
slush funds are problematic. If a defendant offers a lump sum amount to
resolve a group of claims, and the plaintiffs' lawyer or a mediator
determines how to allocate that amount among the individual clients, the
offers conveyed to the clients should add up to the total offered by the
defendant. If the lawyer favors certain clients over others for reasons
other than the value of the claims, then the lawyer is succumbing to the

193. See supra Part I.A.
194. See supra Part II.B-F.
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95
client-client conflict of interest inherent in the aggregate settlement.,
That conflict of interest is subject to consent only to the extent the lawyer
believes that she can give loyal representation to each of the
reasonably
96
clients. 1
Moreover, the slush fund approach to obtaining client consent almost
inevitably involves deception. Imagine a lawyer telling each client
honestly that a portion of the defendant's lump-sum offer has been
reserved to increase the dollar amounts for clients who decline the initial
allocation! In the fen-phen settlements involving the Napoli firm, the
Locks firm, and the Kentucky lawyers, the plaintiffs' lawyers were
accused of leading their clients to believe that the defendant had offered
certain amounts, when in fact the defendant had made a lump-sum offer
and left the allocation to the plaintiffs' lawyers. Misleading clients about
the nature of the offers and the source of the allocation violates not only
the general rule against deceptive conduct, 197 but also the requirement of
disclosure and informed consent for aggregate settlements. 198
In sum, a slush fund is one possible response by plaintiffs' lawyers to
the pressure created by the need to obtain every client's consent to a
settlement. Such reserve funds may tempt lawyers to misallocate funds
for their own benefit by favoring some clients over others. Worse, if a
reserve fund results in a remainder after clients have been satisfied, it
may tempt a lawyer to misappropriate client funds. Even if lawyers take
no more than their legitimate fee, the slush fund approach involves
deception of clients and a client-client conflict.

E. The Loyalty Problem
If a settlement is conditioned on participation by all of a lawyer's
clients, the lawyer faces a difficult situation when individual clients
decline the settlement. Some lawyers have withdrawn from representing99
non-assenting clients, raising ethical concerns about attorney loyalty.'
Numerous cases have held that a client's rejection of a settlement

195.
196.
197.

See MODEL
See MODEL
See MODEL
See MODEL

RULES
RULES
RULES
RULES

OF
OF
OF
OF

PROF'L
PROF'L
PROF'L
PROF'L

CONDUCT
CONDUCT
CONDUCT
CONDUCT

R.
R.
R.
R.

1.7(a)(2), 1.8(g) (2009).
1.7(b) (2009).
8.4(c) (2009).

1.8(g) (2009).
198.
199. In some cases, lawyers' motions to withdraw from representing non-settling clients
apparently have been handled without much attention to the ethical issues involved in such
withdrawal. See, e.g., Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 516 (N.J. 2006)
(noting that the trial court granted the plaintiffs' attorney's motion "for leave to withdraw as counsel
for parties declining the agreement due to a conflict between those plaintiffs who had signed the
settlement agreement and those who had not").
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recommended by the lawyer does not constitute good cause for a lawyer
to terminate the representation. 20 0 Moreover, under the circumstances of
an aggregate settlement offer, a lawyer's threat to withdraw has a
coercive aspect that impinges on the client's unquestioned right to decide
whether to accept or reject a settlement. 0
The issue of loyalty in aggregate settlements came to the fore in the
controversy over the Vioxx settlement.20 2 That settlement required that
20 3
any participating lawyer recommend the settlement to all of her clients
and withdraw from representing any client who declined the
settlement. 20 4 These controversial provisions, included because of the
defendant's insistence that the deal be all-inclusive as to each
participating lawyer, put enormous pressure on clients to accept the
settlement.
From the perspective of a lawyer who has been given an all-ornothing settlement offer, the conflict of interest between would-be
settling and non-settling clients is palpable. In the face of such a
conflict, a lawyer might want to conclude that withdrawal is not only a
reasonable course of action, but ethically necessary.20 5 If withdrawal
200. See DeFlumer v. LeSchack & Grodensky, P.C., No. 99-CV-1650 (NAM/DRH), 2000 WL
654608, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2000) ("The mere fact that an attorney and client may disagree
over a proposed settlement will not establish good cause for withdrawal of representation.");
Marrero v. Christiano, 575 F. Supp. 837, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[T]he refusal of a client to accept a
settlement offer is not good and sufficient cause for the withdrawal of the attorney."); Tsavaris v.
Tsavaris, 244 So.2d 450, 452-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); In re Busby, 616 N.Y.S.2d 755, 756
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Michael D. Tully Co. v. Dollney, 537 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987); ABA-BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 31:1107 (Ellen J. Benett et al.
ed., ABA/BNA 2004) (citing Hobart v. Decker (In re Falco), 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 815 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987)); see also Hobart v. Decker, 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 815-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting
lawyer's quantum meruit fee application on grounds that client's rejection of settlement was not
good cause for withdrawal); May v. Seibert, 264 S.E.2d 643, 646 (W. Va. 1980) (same).
201.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009).

202. See supraPart II.E.
203. Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 127, § 1.2.8.1.
204. Id.§ 1.2.8.2.
205. Indeed, under some circumstances involving settling and non-settling clients, withdrawal
may be mandatory. See N.C. State Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 251 (1997) (Where a lawyer represents four
personal injury claimants and the insurance coverage cannot compensate all four clients fully, the
lawyer may have to withdraw from all of the clients if they do not agree on a settlement: "The
lawyer must withdraw from the representation of all of the claimants if the lawyer is placed in the
role of advocate for one or more of the claimants against the other claimants. The lawyer must also
withdraw from the representation if one or more of the claimants do not agree to accept the
settlement offer. If the lawyer must withdraw, the lawyer may continue to represent one or more of
the claimants only with the consent of the claimants whose cases the lawyer relinquishes."); Tenn.
Bd. Prof'l Resp., Ethics Op. 95-F-136 (1995) (Where an attorney represents both a personal injury
claimant and the client's health insurer with a subrogation interest, "[a]t the time of the initial
contact by the health insurance provider, the attorney should advise the health insurance provider
both orally and in writing that if both clients do not agree on the proposed settlement, then the
lawyer may not continue his multiple employment and must withdraw from representing the health
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were ethically required, however, it is not clear that the lawyer could
drop the non-settling clients while continuing to represent the settling
clients. Rather, it may be that the lawyer would have to withdraw from
all of the clients, absent consent.2 °6 A lawyer may not drop one client
like a "hot potato" in order to represent a more lucrative client.20 7 It is
difficult to see any ethical justification for withdrawing from only those
clients who decline a settlement offer, particularly given the law's
insistence that the settlement decision belongs to the client.20 8
Lawyer loyalty issues may arise whenever a lawyer and client
disagree about a settlement, but all-or-nothing settlements introduce
loyalty issues in the most emphatic way. In an all-or-nothing settlement,
the loyalty question is whether a lawyer can continue to represent certain
clients after their rejection of a settlement threatens to kill an entire deal.
Even more starkly, loyalty questions arise when withdrawal is
contractually mandated, as in the Vioxx settlement. In that circumstance,
the deal's all-or-nothing character is itself a function of a disloyalty
requirement.
F. The Informed Consent Problem
Defendants' insistence on comprehensive settlements gives rise to
special problems of informed consent. The decision to accept or reject a
settlement belongs to clients,20 9 and aggregate settlements in particular
require clients' informed consent after disclosure of the terms of the deal.
The Rules of Professional Conduct spell out the requirement for
aggregate settlements:

insurer."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(i), illus. 2 (2000) (In a

two-client aggregate settlement with insufficient coverage for both claimants, "[i]f one client wishes
to accept and the other wishes to reject the proposed settlement, Lawyer may continue to represent
both A and B only after a renewal of informed consent by each.").
206. N.C. State Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 251 (1997).
207. See, e.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 F.2d 578, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Santacroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367 (D.N.J. 2001) ("The 'Hot Potato Doctrine' has evolved
to prevent attorneys from dropping one client like a 'hot potato' to avoid conflict with another, more
remunerative client.").
208. My point is not that conflicts between settling and non-settling clients require withdrawal.
On the contrary, most conflicts of interest in mass settlements are consentable. Rather than require
withdrawal whenever client choices diverge, the sounder approach in most cases is to address
conflicts through the informed consent provisions of the aggregate settlement rule. My point here is
simply that lawyers may not conveniently invoke the conflict of interest rules as a basis for dropping
non-settling clients while continuing to represent those who accept a settlement.
209.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009).
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A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims . . . unless each client
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or
pleas involved
and of the participation of each person in the
2 10
settlement.
In theory, there is no inconsistency between all-or-nothing
settlements and the requirement of informed consent. Compliance with
the aggregate settlement rule simply requires that the lawyer disclose the
terms of the deal and give each client the opportunity to accept or reject
the settlement. A lawyer who represents a group of claimants could
inform each client that the defendant has agreed to settle on condition
that the settlement include every claimant in the group. The lawyer
could explain the terms of the deal to each client, showing how much the
client would receive and how that amount fits into the overall allocation.
The problem is that an all-or-nothing settlement puts enormous
pressure on the plaintiffs' lawyer to obtain a "yes" from every client.
The lawyer's duty to provide a straightforward disclosure bumps up
against the hard reality that a non-settling client may ruin the deal for the
entire group and, as a result, may deny the lawyer a hefty fee. The
plaintiffs' lawyer understands the risk of strategic hold outs as well as the
more general risk of non-settling claimants. A lawyer seeking to ensure
full participation thus may be inclined to provide less-than-completeand-honest disclosures about the terms of the overall deal. In the cases
involving the Leeds Morelli settlements, 211 clients accused the law firm
of pressuring the clients to consent and failing to disclose the full extent
of the law firm's relationship with the defendants.2t 2 In the cases
involving the Kentucky fen-phen settlement, 21 3 the Napoli fen-phen
settlement, 2 14 and the Phillips chemical plant settlement, 2 15 plaintiffs
similarly accused the lawyers of pressuring clients to accept the deal and
failing to make proper disclosures about the overall settlement.21 6
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2009).
211. See supra Part llD.
212. See Juni, supra note 105 ("[The Leeds Morelli clients] said they were browbeaten into
accepting settlements" that their law firm negotiated with Prudential.); Neil, supra note 105 ("These
plaintiffs now claim they were pressured into settling without knowing about the possible $5 million

payment....").
213. See supraPart II.A.
214. See supra Part II.B.
215. See supra Part IIF.
216. See also Goffney v. O'Quinn, No. 01-02-00192-CV, 2004 WL 2415067, at **8-9 (Tex.
App. Oct. 28, 2004) (involving claims that lawyer pressured clients to accept all-or-nothing
aggregate settlement of claims of toxic chemical exposure at Brio work site).
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Alternatively, there is a risk that lawyers seeking to ensure full
participation may give each client little genuine choice about whether to
say yes. The main criticism of the Vioxx settlement2 17 was not that there
were incomplete or misleading disclosures; indeed, it was an

uncommonly transparent deal. Rather, the criticism was that the clients'
informed consent was meaningless because they essentially had no real
choice. When a lawyer tells a client that the lawyer will withdraw if the
client declines the settlement, few clients can say no.
The challenge of obtaining universal consent to settlements has led
to proposals to abandon the informed consent requirement in mass

aggregate settlements or to permit lawyers to obtain their clients' consent
in advance. Most prominently, the Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation includes a detailed proposal to allow clients to bind themselves
in advance to an aggregate settlement based on a supermajority vote of
the client group.2 18 Cases had uniformly held that advance consent was
impermissible under the aggregate settlement rule; client consent to
aggregate settlements must be based on disclosure of the actual terms of
the deal. 2 19 The ALl proposal for statutory reform would overrule these
cases. By permitting clients to agree in advance to be bound by a yet-tobe-negotiated deal, the proposal would bypass the back-end problem of
informed consent. Rather than truly eliminating the problem of informed
consent, however, the proposal frontloads the problem. It raises
questions about whether clients, at the time they sign initial retainer
agreements, can understand the implications of waiving their right to
individually decide whether to settle.22 °

It also raises questions about

217. See supra Part II.E.
218.

AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 5, § 3.17(b).

219. See Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975) ("An
agreement ... which allows a case to be settled contrary to the wishes of the client and without his
approving the terms of the settlement is opposed to the basic fundamentals of the attorney-client
relationship."); Knisley v. City of Jacksonville, 497 N.E.2d 883, 887 (I11.App. Ct. 1986) ("[l]t is
essential that the final settlement be subject to the client's ratification particularly in a non-class
action case .... ); Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 522 (N.J. 2006)
("Before a client may be bound by a settlement, he or she must have knowledge of the terms of the
settlement and agree to them."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and ProfI Responsibility, Formal Op. 06438 (2006); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Ethics Op. 2009-06 (2009).
220. See Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute 's Draft Proposalto Bypass the Aggregate
Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L.
REv. 395, 419-20 (2008) ("It is difficult to imagine that attorneys could provide disclosures at the
outset of the representations that would be adequate for unsophisticated mass tort clients to
reasonably understand the material risks of such waivers."). As one ethics committee recently put it,
'[l]nformed consent' to an advance waiver is virtually a contradiction in terms. ... In
most cases, at the outset of an engagement, and indeed at any point prior to an actual
settlement negotiation, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for a lawyer to possess, and
therefore disclose, enough information to enable the client to understand the risks of
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whether, if such advance consent were permitted, clients would have
realistic options to obtain legal representation without giving such
advance consent. Finally, it raises questions about whether such advance
consent, even if truly informed and truly consensual, is fundamentally
inconsistent with the lawyer's role in representing clients in nonclass
These are difficult questions beyond the scope of this
disputes.
Article. 22 1 For present purposes, the point is that defendants' insistence
on all-or-nothing settlements puts pressure on the ethical requirement of
informed consent. That pressure leads not only to cases of incomplete or
misleading disclosures, but also to efforts to dilute the informed consent
requirement by disconnecting it from the actual terms of a settlement.
G. The Collusion Problem
All-or-nothing settlements align certain interests of plaintiffs'
counsel with the interests of the defendant, potentially to the
disadvantage of individual plaintiffs. A lawyer who represents numerous
plaintiffs stands to benefit greatly by completing a deal for the resolution
of all of the claims.
The risk of collusion is now well recognized in settlement class
actions. As the Amchem and Ortiz class actions were making their way
up to the Supreme Court, several observers pointed out that class counsel
faced strong incentives to acquiesce in defendants' demands. 2 John
Coffee described the "reverse auction" problem: "settlement class actions
permit defendants to run a reverse auction, seeking the lowest bidder
from a large population of plaintiffs' attorneys.' 2 3 Because the terms of
a settlement class action are negotiated before class certification is
granted, a would-be class lawyer who bargains too hard risks losing the
opportunity to represent the settlement class, while a would-be class
lawyer who agrees to settle on terms favorable to the defendant gets the
chance to represent the class and earn substantial fees.224 Settlement
waiving the right to approve a settlement following disclosure of all material facts and
terms.
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Ethics Op. 2009-06 (2009).
221. These problems are addressed in Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2.
222.

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95

COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1367-84 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting
While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1051-85
(1995); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions
Seeking MonetaryRelief 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 447-76 (1996).
223. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rule of Law: The Corruptionof the Class Action, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
1994, at AI5; see also Coffee, Class Wars, supranote 222, at 1379.
224. Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and InquisitorialJustice, 87 GEO. LJ. 1983,
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class actions also present a risk of collusive side deals that benefit a
lawyer's nonclass clients at the expense of class members, as a defendant
may be willing to pay a premium on individual claims in order to secure
class counsel's agreement to a cheaper settlement of the class claims. 225
To a large extent, nonclass settlements do not raise the same
concerns about collusion as settlement class actions. A nonclass
settlement differs from a settlement class action, in which a lawyer who
successfully strikes a deal with the defendant gets the benefit of seeking
class certification and settlement approval as the presumptive class
counsel. In a nonclass aggregate settlement, the reverse auction risk does
not exist, as each lawyer already represents a roster of clients and the
defendant has no power to offer the franchise to the lowest bidder.
Nonetheless, nonclass aggregate settlements present a risk of
collusion, especially in all-or-nothing deals.226 In the Leeds Morelli
settlements of its clients' employment claims, 227 the law firm struck deals
with defendants in which the firm agreed to accept substantial payments
and to be retained by the defendants as a paid consultant. At the core of
the disputes over these settlements is the concern that the firm's interests
became aligned with those of the employer defendants, potentially at the
expense of its own clients.
Similarly, an all-or-nothing settlement of claims involving DuPont's
fungicide Benlate resulted in disciplinary sanctions against the plaintiffs'
lawyers amidst charges of collusion.228 The plaintiffs' law firm
represented twenty clients with claims of property damage. DuPont
agreed to settle the claims for $59 million conditioned upon (1) the
participation of all twenty clients, (2) the law firm's agreement not to
represent the current clients or others in further Benlate proceedings, and
2002 (1999).
225. Id. See also Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 222, at 1373-74 ("[B]oth sides have an
incentive to trade a settlement of the plaintiffs' attorney's entire inventory (on terms favorable to the
attorney) for a global settlement in a class action of all future claims (on terms favorable to the
defendants)."); Koniak, supra note 222, at 1064 (arguing that class counsel in Amchem settled over
14,000 asbestos cases outside the class framework while they were negotiating the Gerogine class
action).
226. See Roger Cramton, Lawyer Ethics on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31
PEPP. L. REV. 175, 194 (2003) ("The dangers of self-interested, and even collusive, behavior by
plaintiff lawyers have been recognized as a serious problem in class action cases. Consolidated
cases that involve hundreds or thousands of claimants involve an even greater problem because all of
the protections of class actions have been eliminated .... "); see also Burch, supra note 166, at 11
("Settlements advantage those most familiar with the process, the repeat players: plaintiffs' attorneys
and defense attorneys as well as judges.").
227. See supra Part II.D.
228. Fla. Bar v. Rodriguez, 959 So.2d 150, 153, 161-62 (Fla. 2007); David D. Dodge, Secret
Settlement Terms Can Spell Trouble, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Sept. 2008, at 8, 8.
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(3) the law firm's agreement to be retained by DuPont after the
settlement was completed; DuPont would pay the plaintiffs' law firm
directly. 22 9 The lawyers did not disclose these terms to their clients or to
the court. 230 A client eventually learned of the deal and reported the
matter to the Florida Bar.231 One of the lawyers was disbarred, two were
suspended, one received a public reprimand, and all four were ordered to
disgorge their fees. 232 The Florida Supreme Court, finding numerous

ethical violations, emphasized the extent to which the lawyers' loyalty to
their clients was compromised by their relationship with the defendant:
DuPont while still representing his Benlate
"He became an agent 2for
33
clients against DuPont.

Even in the absence of direct payments from defendants or
consultancy agreements, all-or-nothing aggregate settlements present a
risk that plaintiffs' lawyers will advance the interests they share with
defendants rather than maximizing the interests of their clients. If a
lawyer can negotiate a reasonably lucrative deal that resolves the claims
of the lawyer's entire roster of relevant clients, then the lawyer takes a
hefty fee and moves on to new business. Plaintiffs' lawyers thus share
defendants' interest in closing a deal and getting all of the plaintiffs on
board.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article has pointed out the trouble with all-or-nothing
settlements both by telling stories of mass settlements gone awry and by
cataloguing seven types of problems that are generated or exacerbated by
all-or-nothing deals.
First, all-or-nothing settlements create both client-client and lawyerclient conflicts of interest, and the requirement of full participation
exacerbates conflicts that exist in other aggregate settlements. Second,
they introduce problems concerning the allocation of settlement funds,
including incentives to misallocate. Third, they create a risk of strategic
holdouts, as savvy clients may attempt to extort additional money by
withholding their consent to the deal. Fourth, they create an incentive for

229. Rodriguez, 959 So.2d at 154-55.

230. Id. at 155.
231. Id.at 156.
232. Id.at 153.
233. Id. at 160. Cf.In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding a conflict of
interest as there was a choice between the lawyer's "maximizing his fee versus his client's interest in
maximizing the amount paid to them").
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lawyers to keep settlement money in reserve as a slush fund to ensure
full participation, leading to problems of misallocation and client
deception. Fifth, they create or exacerbate a loyalty problem by
pressuring lawyers to withdraw from representing non-settling clients.
Sixth, they create special problems concerning clients' informed consent
to aggregate settlements. And seventh, they introduce a risk of collusion
as the interest of plaintiffs' counsel aligns with the defendant's interest in
getting every plaintiff to sign on to the deal. In sum, settlements that
insist upon total participation place claimants' counsel in the ethically
precarious position of facing unavoidable conflicts of interest and
powerful incentives to deceive and abuse some clients in order to get the
deal done. Because of these problems, lawyers generally should resist
demands for all-or-nothing settlement terms, courts should refrain from
pressuring parties to reach absolute closure, and ethics committees and
rule-makers should resist demands to alter rules in the service of all-ornothing settlements.
The fact remains, however, that mass aggregate settlements are an
essential component in the resolution of widespread disputes, and peace
is a key objective of most defendants in negotiating mass settlements.
What is the alternative to all-or-nothing settlements? In mass disputes,
the alternative to all-or-nothing settlements is not individual trials and
individual settlements of every claim, which in most cases would be
foolishly inefficient. Rather, the realistic alternatives are nonclass mostor-nothing settlements or binding class settlements in certified class
actions.
One alternative is what I call most-or-nothing settlements. Many
disputes are successfully resolved without all-or-nothing terms but rather
with settlements that contain walkaway clauses requiring 85, 90, or 95%
participation. Most-or-nothing settlements do not guarantee absolute
peace in the sense of promising that every client is on board.234
Inasmuch as defendants value comprehensive peace, it is fair to presume
in many cases that the failure to provide such a guarantee of total peace
235
means that claimants lose some of the value in the settlement.
234. Most-or-nothing settlements also do not guarantee the removal of a particular plaintiffs' law
firm from the litigation, but in any event such a guarantee would run afoul of the ethical prohibition
on restricting a lawyer's practice. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2009) ("A
lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's
right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.").
235. See Richard Nagareda, Public and Private Law Perspectives: Transcript of Professor
RichardNagareda,37 Sw. U. L. REv. 659, 661 (2008) ("Why have we in the law bothered thinking
for so long about how to legitimize these sorts of settlement arrangements? I submit that the driving
intuition is that they have a considerable potential ... to be value-generating transactions for both
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Although they do not guarantee total peace, most-or-nothing settlements
provide substantial finality. A reasonable settlement may well attract the
participation of all of the eligible claimants even without an all-ornothing clause. Overwhelmingly, clients follow their lawyer's advice on
whether to accept a settlement. Without an all-or-nothing clause, there is
nothing to be gained by holding out, as no individual client can hold the
deal hostage. Even if a few clients decline the settlement, the defendant
can quantify the remaining risk and largely put the litigation behind it.
Mass settlements with most-or-nothing provisions raise far fewer
ethical concerns than those that require unanimity. Although they
involve certain conflicts of interest, introduce allocation challenges, and
require informed consent after full disclosure, they do not create the
same pressure to obtain a yes from every client. Most-or-nothing
settlements therefore do not present the same holdout risk and are
unlikely to lead plaintiffs' lawyers to use slush funds to ensure
participation. Nor do they present as strong a risk of collusion or
disloyalty. Moreover, because defendants place value on ensuring that
mass settlements draw the participation of strong claimants as well as
weaker ones, most-or-nothing settlements should be less likely than allor-nothing settlements to undervalue the strongest claims. Settlements
with genuine walkaway clauses guarantee defendants sufficient finality
to make settlement worthwhile but, unlike all-or-nothing settlements and
their functional equivalents, they leave an ethical safety valve so that
lawyers need not pressure or lure every client into submission.
Another alternative, of course, is the class action. If a defendant
seeks to settle with an entire claimant group, the defendant may try to
negotiate a settlement class action or, if a litigation class has been
certified, the defendant may negotiate a settlement of the class action. In
place of individual settlement autonomy, class actions substitute
procedural protections including class certification, appointment of class
counsel, judicial control of fees, and judicial approval of settlement after
notice and a hearing. Like most-or-nothing settlements, settlement class
actions generally do not guarantee total peace-money damages class
actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) permit opt-outsbut they do provide significant finality and allow defendants to constrain
and quantify the remaining risk. The great limitation of class actions as

sides of the litigation as well as for society as a whole. That is why it is worth the legal system's
time, and our time, to sort out these arrangements. Value-generation-the capacity of these deals to
create wealth that would not otherwise exist-is directly related to the peace that the deal actually
delivers and, hence, to the coercive power that it exercises.").
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peace-creators is that many mass disputes are unsuitable for class
certification because of the predominance of individual issues.
Even in disputes that do not lend themselves to class certification,
defendants may demand greater finality than can be guaranteed by a
most-or-nothing nonclass settlement. These are the situations in which
the call for all-or-nothing deals is strongest. In appropriate cases,
nonclass settlements conditioned on total peace may generate significant
value while creating only a manageable level of ethical tension, but as a
general matter, such settlements ought not be exalted as the desired
endgame of mass disputes. The value of conditioning settlements on full
participation must be weighed against the trouble caused by such
insistence.

